THE SOLICITOR. 777 



the same or similar character but as well in the case of the trunk 

 lines. It is plain that the statute contemplates that an individual 

 responsibility should attach, in the course of interstate transportation 

 of live stock, to every carrier accepting a sliipment on which the 

 statutory limit has expired. This being so, it is no defense for a 

 connecting or terminal carrier to say that it transported further 

 stock on which the statu toiy limit had expired, as a matter of hu- 

 manity, since that was the quickest way to secure food and water for 

 them. In the individual case tliis may perhaps be true sometimes, 

 but on principle the contention is without merit. This position is 

 well stated by Wolverton, J., in United States v. Northern Pacific 

 Terminal Co. (Circular No. 53, Office of the Solicitor, supra), where 

 he said: 



The enforcement of the law will be better subserved if connecting carriers will 

 refuse to carry any stock that has been confined in cars by a preceding carrier beyond 

 the time limit. Indeed, as I interpret the statute, they violate the law if they do not 

 80 refuse. The terminal company could not be made amenable to the State law for 

 prevention of cruelty to animals so long as it did not have charge or was not in posses^ 

 rion of the stock. It was not bound to take it from the possession of the Southern 

 Pacific Co. The dilemma was that company's, and none other was called upon ta 

 relieve it. Hence I hold that the terminal company rendered itself liable when it 

 assumed possession for the purpose of forwarding the stock on its way to destination ^ 



Holt, J., in United States v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. (Circular No, 

 44, Office of the Solicitor, supra), points out a distinction which had 

 not theretofore been formulated: "Is the movement substantially a 

 part of the process of unloading or is it a continuance of transporta- 

 tion ?" In many cases terminal companies own. and use many miles of 

 tracks, and it is certain that delivery to the consignee, as a matter of 

 law, is not made at the moment when the stock are turned over to 

 the terminal company but only when they are actually unloaded. 

 Tliis would seem to bring terminal companies squarely within the 

 ruling in United States v. Lehigh Valley K. R. Co. 

 ^ An important decision of the circuit court of appeals for the eighth 

 circuit, apparently at varir.nce with the basis of an earher decision, 

 of a lower court, is United States v. Wabash R. R. Co., 182 Fed., 

 802. In this case the Government recovered, first, from the terminal 

 company, for a confinement of stock on its own line, of less than 28 

 hours, the initial carrier having confined the stock previous^ in 

 excess of the statutory period. The lower court held that the Gov- 

 ernment could not recover, but this ruling was reversed on appeal by 

 the circuit court of appeals for the eighth circuit. In United States 

 V. Stock Yards Terminal Co. (Circular No. 26, Office of the Sohcitor,^ 

 Circular No. 33, Office ot the Solicitor; 178 Fed., 19), the lower court 

 held that there could be no recover}^ against the terminal company 

 where the Government had jjreviously recovered from the connect- 

 ing carrier for detaining the same shipment. While affirming the 

 decision of the court below, it is to be noted that the circuit court of 

 appeals for the eighth circuit sought ground of decision not touched 

 upon in the opinion of the lower court. " It has been urged that the 

 position of several connecting carriers each of which violates the law 

 on the same shipment, is analogous to that of joint tort feasors, and, 

 consequently, that recovery against one bars recovery from any of 

 the others, unless each carrier itself detains the stock on its own 

 line beyond the statutor}^ period. The decision of the circuit court 

 of appeals in the Wabash case disposes of this contention in that 

 circuit. 



