ANIMAL BEHAVIOR. 31I 



srence. In the human race instmctive actions characterize the 

 life of the savage, while they fall more and more into the back- 

 ground in the more intellectual races. 



Every hypothesis that would derive instinctive action from 

 teleological reflection is open to the same objections. In many 

 cases it would be necessary to postulate an amount of prevision 

 on the part of the animals in which the instincts arose that 

 would simply be psychologically impossible. Conscious pre- 

 vision without a possible basis in the experience of the 

 individual, or any means of learning from others, is simply a 

 self-contradiction. The frequently cited instance of the emperor 

 moth puts this point in strong light. The caterpillar of this 

 moth so constructs the upper part of its cocoon that it will 

 resist strong pressure from without and yield to slight pressure 

 from within. Easy egress for the imago and security against 

 attacks from outside enemies are thus provided for. As the 

 spinning of the cocoon happens but once in a lifetime, the 

 caterpillar could not anticipate such needs from its own experi- 

 ence, nor could it learn from its parents, which were dead long 

 before it hatched. The possibility of imitation is also excluded, 

 as the species is not a social one. 



b. Theories of Instinct. 



I. Pnt'e Instinct the Point of Departure. — The first criterion 

 of instinct is, that it can be performed by the animal without 

 learning by experience, instruction, or imitation. The first 

 performance is therefore the crucial one. It is of the utmost 

 importance in all discussion of the origin of instinct to make 

 sure of this point, and keep clear of all ambiguous activities 

 such as have been designated " instinct habits " (Lloyd Mor- 

 gan), "acquired instincts" (Wundt), "secondary instincts" 

 (Romanes), etc. We must not allow the question as to the 

 . relation of instinct to habit and intelligence to be obscured 

 by confusing terminology. There may be "mixtures" and all 

 sorts of " interactions " between habit and instinct, and these 

 may have a far-reaching theoretical import, but they lack definite- 

 ness, and are therefore dangerous foundations for theories. A 



