LAW OF THE FARM 293 



reasonable care and diligence to prevent it spreading and doing injury to the 

 property of others. The time may be suitable and the manner prudent; and 

 vet if he be guilty of negligence in taking care of it, and it spreads and 

 injures the property of another in consequence of such negligence, he is liable 

 in damages for the injury done; and it is immaterial whether the proof estab- 

 lishes gross negligence, or only a want of ordinary care on the part of the 

 person who sets the fire. 



I will endeavor to illustrate this question, in the use of fire, by a few cases 

 in which the party's conduct has been considered. Jones entered a house with 

 a lighted candle; the house was soon after clestroyed by fire. King set out a 

 fire for the purpose of clearing his land, the weather being warm and the land 

 dry. Adams started a fire on his farm, and left it apparently safe; an 

 unlooked-for change in the weather ensued ; a strong wind sprang up and 

 carried the fire to the adjoining premises. Smith set fire to a heap of logs 

 under circumstances similar to those last named, and the same consequences 

 followed. In all these cases, these facts standing alone were held not suf- 

 ficient to raise the presumption of negligence and fix the liability of the jjarty 

 setting the fire. On the other hand, Jones, while driving a herd of sheep 

 through the country, encamped near a farmer's premises, and started a fire 

 near his house and barn ; there was a quantity of dry brush and other material 

 scattered around. Jones continued his journey without extinguishing the 

 fire, and the farmer's -barn was burned. Pope, having given a party permis- 

 sion to cut wood on his land, started a fire very near one of the piles, which 

 escaped from his control and consumed it. Jones, intending to burn up the 

 brush on his own land, set fire to it within six feet of his neighbor's laud, 

 which was also covered with brush. Smith, in a very dry time, set fire to a 

 heap of logs within five yards of his neighbor's fence; a dead pine tree and 

 much combustible matter being between the log-pile and the fence. In all 

 these cases, negligence was held to be manifest ; and the parties setting the 

 fire were obliged to respond in damages. So when Mr. Sun, in an unusually 

 dry summer, set fire to logs on his fallow, adjoining the woodland of his 

 neighbor, the fallow and the woodland were both covered with combustible 

 matter; the day before the fire was set there had been a heavy shower; but it 

 afterwards became dry and hot, and a high wind carried the fire to the 

 neighbor's woodland. So H., having stacked his hay in too green a condition, 

 was warned by his neighbor that it would be liable to generate fire ; subse- 

 quently, observing it smoking, he remarked that he would ''chance it;" ulti- 

 mately it burst into a flame, which spread to his neighbor's barn and con- 

 sumed it. So when Stevens was engaged in threshing wheat in a field, with 

 a steam engine, the wind increased so as to make it dangerous to continue to 

 run the machine; but he kept on, and his neighbor's property was destroyed. 

 In these cases, L,, H., and S. were held chargeable with negligence, and were 

 obliged to pay the damages. 



LECTUKE NUMBER FIVE. 



At common law no man is obliged to fence his lands. The owner of beasts 

 is bound to restrain them, and he is answerable for any trespass which they 

 may commit. In other words, by the common law, the owner of cattle must 

 fence them in, and the neighbor is not bound to fence them out. 



