382 THE CAT. [chap. xi. 



" animal soul," wliich is not equally valid against all tliose concep 

 tious, " cause," " being," " substance," &c., A^dthout tbe acceptance 

 of which, our intellectual activity must come to an end altogether. 



This principle of individuation, then, this soul, or -^vxri, animates 

 the ic//o/c body, and presides over all its actions ; which are, indeed, 

 its actions, the body, as a whole, being its "organ" — the function 

 of such " organ " being the " soul's action " or " life." Not to admit 

 this is to be driven to the absurdity of conceiving the living body to 

 be made up of an indefinite quantity of minute independent 

 organisms, without subordination or co-ordination, each with its own 

 principle of individuation, its own soul.* This conception, indeed, 

 but multiplies difficulties, since the same arguments can be brought 

 against each of these souls, or against the one soul, while to affirm 

 their existence and deny functional unity, is to contradict the direct 

 evidence of our senses as regards other organisms, and even the 

 evidence of consciousness itself as regards our own ; for each man's 

 own feelings and perceptions declare to him that he is one whole — 

 a living unity in multiplicity. 



§ 14. But some writers who fully recognize the fact of the two co- 

 existing cycles of animal life (the physical and the immaterial) have 

 regarded the latter (the immaterial) as the mere effect of the former 

 (the physical), and have denied to the feelings of animals, or to the 

 thoughts of men, any power to act as causes in the events of life — 

 both animals and men being regarded as mere automata. But the 

 notion that an animal is rca/l// a machine is an absurdity ; for a 

 machine is a complex structure, the actions of which are fully to 

 be accounted for by the physical properties of its component parts 

 and the action of merely physical forces — without the intervention 

 of sensation, or of any influences like those which induce nutrition 

 and reproduction in living creatures. A clock, to be really compar- 

 able with an animal, must be capable of winding itself up, gathering 

 oil to replace that which is used up in its movements, repairing any 

 trifling injuries which may result from the friction of its wheels, 

 and finally, of giving forth from time to time miniature reproductions 

 of itself destined ultimately to attain the size of the parent timepiece. 



Now an animal such as the cat, is a complex structure which 

 really has all these powers, and its parts are, as we have seen, so 

 mutually adjusted to serve one another, that it may be said to be a 

 mechanism the parts of which arc reciprocally ends and means. 

 The nervous system ministers to the circulation, the circulation to 

 the nervous system, and both these to the alimentary system which 

 nourishes them again ; and so on throughout the Avhole complex 

 collection of apparatus which make up the cat's body. 



But that body is one which, like a machine, <hcs act mechanically 

 and necessarily, because its actions are necessarily determined by the 

 adjustments of its various parts. Yet its actions do not take place 

 without sensations, and these sensations arc not the mere accom- 



* As has been alTirmed by Professoi- Haeckel. 



