380 



THE CAT. 



[chap. XI. 



accompanied by a chain of immaterial energies, some part of whicli 

 we know in ourselves as conscious feeling and thouglit ; but the rest 

 of which, in ourselves, and in all other living creatures, we can 

 only know by rational inference. The chain of phj^sical phenomena 

 consists of the actions of that side of the one living whole, which wo 

 call its visible body. The chain of immaterial energies consists of 

 the actions of that side of the one living whole which is its principle 

 of individuation, its "ps//chc," or "soul." 



§ 12. The word "soul" must not be understood to denote that 

 which it has been, in modern times, commonly used to express. By 

 it is not meant a substance numerically distinct from the animal's 

 body, and which may be conceived as capable of surviving the des- 

 truction of the latter * — a conception which is unphilosophical as 

 well as unscientific. 



We have seen that structure and function ever vary together, just 

 as the convexities and concavities of the same curved line do and 

 must vary together. In the same way the " principle of indi^'idua- 

 tion," or "soul," of any animal (and of any plant either), and its 

 material organisation, of which that soul is the " function," must 

 necessarily arise, vary, and be destroyed simultaneously, unless some 

 special character, as in the case of man, leads us to consider it ex- 

 ceptional in nature. The word "soul," then, as here used, and as 

 used by Aristotle and his followers, does not denote a separate entity 

 which inhabits the body — an extra- organic force within the living 

 creature, and acting by and through it, but numerically distinct from 

 it. It denotes that which as considered apart from the body is but 

 a mental abstraction, but which, considered as one with the body, 

 exists most truly and really as an inseparable part of one indivisible 

 whole — the living body. It and the body are one, as the impress on 

 stamped wax and the wax itself are one, though we can ideally dis- 

 tinsruish between the two. Our common sense assures us of that which 

 science and i)hilosophy confirm, namely, that a living animal is not 

 a piece of complex matter played on by physical forces from without, 

 which transform themselves in passing through it ; but is the ex- 

 pression of a peculiar immanent principle (whensoever and however 

 arising), which for a time manifests its existence by the activities of 

 the body with which it is so entirely one that it may much more 

 truly be said to he the animal than the lump of matter which we can 

 see and handle can be said to be such animal. 



Thus the real, substantial constituent essence of the animal we arc 

 studying — as of every other animal — is not what we see with our 

 eyes ; it is somctliing which ever escapes our senses, though its 

 existence and nature reveal themselves to our intellect. It neces- 

 sarily escapes our senses, because these senses can detect nothing in 



• Even in man, there is no adequate 

 reason for believing in the existence of 

 any principle of individuation, save that 

 which exerts its energy in i^ll his func- 

 tions, the humblest as well aa the most 



•^ 



exalted, though there is good evidence 

 of a philosophical kind tliat in his case 

 tliat i)rinci])lo does survive the dissolu- 

 tion of the body. 



