2/2 Editorials [March, 



and attitude of the Society at large, on practically all questions. 

 When extraordinary occasions arise, surely the Society and the Council 

 can easily obtain the advice and follow the guidance of the most 

 eminent members of the Society. 



The " institutional restriction " in Section 2, B — the exciting cause 

 of the proposal to amend — was a restriction intended to distribute 

 official representatives among separate and independent groups of 

 members. The word " institution " was conveniently used in this par- 

 ticular sense during both the formal and informal discussions prior to 

 the adoption of the Constitution, and has been generally so understood 

 (as a constitutional convenience) since then, by all except a few who 

 have professed to regard it as an artificial and disquieting distinction. 

 I see in it no more danger to the delights and serenity of inter-institu- 

 tional amity than in the stereotyped legend : " From the Biochemical 

 Laboratory of Blank University, U. S. A.," which conventionally 

 emphasizes institutions and sub-institutions as important considera- 

 tions in biochemical activity and acknowledgments. 



The requirement that "no two officers may be from the same in- 

 stitution " effects the maximum degree of distribution of executive 

 representation and responsibility, professional honors and service, and 

 personal influence. The most representative consensus of opinion 

 and action on any subject may be expected from a body thus selected. 



The highest degree of official efficiency, from the representative 

 executive Standpoint, has been an outcome, from the beginning, of the 

 elections of officers — in short, the restriction has worked admirably 

 from the Standpoint of efficiency. 



When the Constitution was originally presented to the Society, in 

 1907, it was publicly said in its support, by the same writer, with 

 practically unanimous approval by the members : 



It is aimed to make the Society thoroughly democratic and to pre- 

 vent retrogression into a decadent executive System with a complacent 

 " we-are-the-people " group at the top. Officers would be deliberately 

 nominated by a large elected committee with that very special duty to 

 perform, and elections could not be farcical. Automatic rotation in 

 Office at short intervals would prevent embarrassment in changing 

 officials, good or bad ; it would constantly distribute the opportunities 

 and occasions for usefulness as well as the honors, and thiis no member 

 would be given fictitious importance. Adoption of the plan of dis- 

 tributing the officials among different laboratories would regularly in- 

 sure perfectly representative composites of executive opinion and 

 action, and would do much to prevent factionalism. 



