﻿154 
  JOURNAL 
  OF 
  THE 
  WASHINGTON 
  ACADEMY 
  OF 
  SCIENCES 
  VOL. 
  12, 
  NO. 
  6 
  

   IV. 
  THE 
  PSYCHICAL 
  MONIST's 
  UNIVERSE 
  

  

  In 
  order 
  to 
  show 
  how 
  our 
  hypothesis 
  may 
  possibly 
  accomplish 
  

   some 
  of 
  the 
  great 
  things 
  claimed 
  for 
  it, 
  we 
  must 
  elaborate 
  its 
  implica- 
  

   tions 
  in 
  further 
  detail. 
  Let 
  us 
  adhere 
  to 
  the 
  use 
  of 
  the 
  second 
  and 
  

   first 
  persons 
  as 
  before 
  to 
  make 
  vivid 
  the 
  situations 
  which 
  are 
  involved. 
  

  

  You 
  must 
  begin 
  your 
  thought 
  with 
  the 
  assumption 
  that 
  the 
  reality 
  

   lying 
  behind 
  your 
  idea 
  or 
  perception 
  of 
  my 
  cerebral 
  process 
  is 
  simply 
  

   my 
  total 
  introspective 
  consciousness. 
  The 
  various 
  material 
  or 
  dy- 
  

   namic 
  components 
  which 
  you 
  perceive 
  or 
  conceive 
  within 
  this 
  brain 
  

   mechanism 
  are 
  merely 
  the 
  individual 
  representations 
  within 
  your 
  own 
  

   consciousness 
  of 
  these 
  components 
  of 
  my 
  consciousness. 
  Each 
  element 
  

   in 
  your 
  picture 
  of 
  my 
  brain 
  process 
  is 
  in 
  reality 
  simply 
  an 
  element 
  of 
  

   your 
  own 
  consciousness, 
  but 
  it 
  may 
  be 
  considered 
  as 
  an 
  efect 
  or 
  product, 
  

   however 
  remote, 
  of 
  the 
  action 
  of 
  a 
  corresponding, 
  but 
  ordinarily 
  quite 
  

   different, 
  element 
  in 
  my 
  consciousness. 
  The 
  structure 
  of 
  the 
  brain 
  

   process 
  is 
  but 
  the 
  reflection 
  in 
  a 
  psychophysical 
  mirror 
  of 
  the 
  structure 
  

   of 
  consciousness; 
  although 
  it 
  is 
  a 
  product 
  not 
  so 
  much 
  of 
  optical 
  

   as 
  of 
  philosophical 
  reflection. 
  

  

  It 
  should 
  be 
  clear 
  to 
  you 
  at 
  once 
  that 
  this 
  hypothesis 
  quite 
  resolves 
  

   the 
  dualism 
  of 
  mind 
  and 
  matter 
  and 
  provides 
  a 
  real 
  explanation 
  of 
  

   the 
  psychophysical 
  relation. 
  It 
  destroys 
  the 
  dualism 
  by 
  dethroning 
  

   matter 
  from 
  its 
  exalted 
  seat 
  as 
  a 
  peer 
  among 
  substances 
  with 
  mind. 
  

   Matter, 
  or 
  electricity, 
  is 
  denied 
  existence 
  except 
  in 
  so 
  far 
  as 
  it 
  is 
  

   actually 
  presented 
  within 
  any 
  given 
  concrete 
  field 
  of 
  experience, 
  but 
  

   within 
  such 
  a 
  field 
  it 
  cannot 
  be 
  the 
  matter 
  concerning 
  which 
  physics 
  

   speaks 
  and 
  can 
  only 
  constitute 
  psychological 
  matter 
  or 
  specific 
  per- 
  

   ceptual 
  complexes 
  of 
  sensory 
  qualities. 
  Hence 
  in 
  so 
  far 
  as 
  our 
  doc- 
  

   trine 
  of 
  psychic 
  monism 
  admits 
  the 
  existence 
  of 
  matter, 
  it 
  classes 
  it 
  

   as 
  a 
  subdivision 
  of 
  consciousness. 
  The 
  physical 
  systems 
  which 
  

   we 
  are 
  considering 
  in 
  our 
  discussion 
  of 
  the 
  brain 
  process, 
  however, 
  

   do 
  not 
  even 
  have 
  this 
  degree 
  of 
  reality, 
  since 
  all 
  that 
  is 
  presented 
  in 
  

   consciousness 
  at 
  the 
  moment 
  of 
  discussion 
  are 
  complexes 
  of 
  visual 
  

   or 
  auditory 
  sensations 
  or 
  images 
  which 
  are 
  commonly 
  called 
  words. 
  

   These 
  words, 
  it 
  is 
  true, 
  are 
  supposed 
  to 
  have 
  meanings, 
  but 
  the 
  mean- 
  

   ings 
  are 
  by 
  hypothesis 
  not 
  regarded 
  as 
  being 
  within 
  consciousness, 
  

   and 
  hence 
  we 
  are 
  quite 
  at 
  liberty 
  — 
  so 
  far 
  as 
  the 
  evidence 
  of 
  immediate 
  

   experience 
  is 
  concerned 
  — 
  to 
  deny 
  their 
  existence 
  altogether. 
  

  

  When 
  we 
  see 
  thus 
  clearly 
  what 
  is 
  actual 
  and 
  what 
  is 
  possibly 
  only 
  

   fictitious 
  in 
  the 
  psychophysical 
  relationship 
  we 
  recognize 
  that 
  this 
  

  

  