154 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



all the maxims above laid down for praise. Definite descriptions of 

 definite failures, without note or comment, are a power to punish. 

 When there are aggravations, such as downright carelessness, a dam- 

 aging commentary may be added ; but, in using terms of reprobation, 

 still more strict regard has to be paid to discrimination and justice. 

 The degrees of badness are sometimes numerical, as by the quantity of 

 lesson missed, and the repetition of inattention ; this very definiteness 

 literally stated is more cutting than epithets. 



Strong terms of reproof should be sparing, in order to be more ef- 

 fective. Still more sparing ought to be tones of anger. Loss of tem- 

 per, however excusable, is really a victory to wrong-doers ; although 

 for the moment it may strike terror. Unless a man is of fiendish nature 

 throughout, he cannot maintain a consistent course, if he gives way 

 to temper. Indignation under control is a mighty weapon. Yet it is 

 mere impotence to utter threats when the power of execution is known 

 to be wanting. There is nothing worse for authority than to over- 

 vaunt itself ; this is the fatal step to the ridiculous. 



Whoever occupies a position of authority ought to be familiar with 

 the general principles and conditions of punishment, as they may be 

 found set forth in the penal code of Bentham. The broad, exhaustive 

 view there given will cooperate beneficially with each one's actual 

 experience. I make no apology for presenting a short summary of his 

 principles. 



After precisely defining the proper ends of punishment, Bentham 

 marks the cases unmeet for punishment: 1. Where it is groundless: 

 that is, where there never has been any real mischief (the other party 

 consenting to what has been done), or where the mischief is over- 

 weighed by a benefit of greater value. 2. Where it is i7iefficacious : 

 including cases where the penal provision has not come before the of- 

 fender's notice, where he is unaware of the consequences of his act, or 

 where he is not a free agent. 3. Cases where it is unprofitable : that 

 is, when the evil of the punishment exceeds the evil of the offense. 

 (The evils of punishment, which have to be summed up and set against 

 the good, are (1) coercion or restraint, (2) the uneasiness of apprehen- 

 sion, (3) the actual suffering, (4) the suffering caused to all those that 

 are in sympathy with the person punished.) 4. Cases where punish- 

 ment is needless: as when the end can be attained in some cheaper 

 way, as by instruction and persuasion. In this class Bentham specially 

 includes the offenses that consist in disseminating pernicious principles 

 in politics, morality, or religion. These should be met by instruction 

 and argument, and not by the penalties of the law. 



Under what he calls the expense or frugality of punishment, Ben- 

 tham urges the necessity of presenting to the mind an adequate notion 

 of what a punishment really is. Hence the advantage of punishments 

 that are easily learned and remembered, and that appear greater and not 

 less than they really are. 



