RELATION OF SOCIOLOGY TO BIOLOGY. 431 



phenomena. On the plane of sentient existence we have, in addition, 

 nerve force and phenomena. On the plane of rational and moral exist- 

 ence we have, in addition to all the preceding, also rational and moral 

 forces and their corresponding phenomena. With every rise to a higher 

 plane we have also, as has already been shown, new doctrines and new 

 characteristic methods. Shall we not, then, on this highest plane also, 

 viz., on the plane of rational and moral existence, the plane of humanity, 

 shall we not have here also new characteristic methods and doctrines 

 connected with this new and higher form of force? It is evident that 

 we must. All the doctrines and methods which I have developed are 

 imported from biology. I have said nothing of characteristic methods 

 and doctrines of sociology. Comte clearly saw the necessity, in accord- 

 ance with the principles of a scientific hierarchy, of a characteristic 

 method, and he thous-ht he had found it in what he calls the historic 

 method. But Comte's historic method, as we have already shown, is 

 nothing but comparison in the phylogenic series — a method which is 

 imported from geology. There must be characteristic methods and 

 doctrines in this highest science also. What are they ? Man is cer- 

 tainly something more than an animal. What is that something more? 

 The answer to these two questions is the same. The characteristic 

 doctrines and methods of sociology are evidently connected with man's 

 higher rational and moral nature — with his distinctive humanity. But 

 the science of this side of our nature is yet so imperfectly developed, 

 our knowledge of these higher phenomena is yet so imperfectly reduced 

 to law, that these characteristic doctrines and methods are not clearly 

 recognized and distinctly formulated. In a word, our knowledge here 

 is not yet scientific; the department has not yet even a distinctive 

 name. For want of a better we shall call it psychology, although it 

 really includes much more than usually goes under that name. But 

 when (if ever) this department of knowledge shall take on a scientific 

 form, then it also must become another basis, another fundamental 

 science, on which must rest sociology. And what sociology is now 

 waiting for, more than for anything else, is the scientific development 

 of this second basis. 



Thus then sociology, unlike other sciences, and because of man's 

 twofold nature, rests not on one only but on tioo more fundamental 

 sciences. The basis which I have developed is the material basis. This 

 is all that the materialists admit. If a pure material philosophy were 

 sufficient, this is all the basis which sociology requires. The fact that 

 it is not suflficient, the fact that another basis is required, is demonstra- 

 tive against a pure material philosophy. According to a pure material 

 philosophy science is a straight shaft rising ever until it pierces heaven. 

 But, on the contrary, if we watch its progress closely, we perceive that 

 it indeed rises straight enough at first ; but as it approaches the plane 

 of humanity it begins to lean and curve to one side, until it inevitably 

 falls over, unless it be supported on that side also. That support which 



