HEIDEL. — ON FRAGMENTS OF THE PRE-SOCRATICS. 713 



sage from C'loantlics ciuotetl by Sext. Enipir. 9. 90, ware ou reXeiou 

 ^ioop 6 avd poiiTOS , areXes de Kal iroXv Kexcoptcr^iei'o;' rod TeXtiov. The 

 questionable fragment of Philolaus, quoted by Diels, and the quotation 

 from Philostratus ap. Euseb. P. E. 4. 13, euL re outl Kal KexoipLafxeuco 

 iravToov, made by Norden, Agnostos Thcos, 39, n. 3, afford but weak 

 support for so unlikely a theory as that of Diels. In printing the 

 fragment, I should plaee a colon between yivojcrKeLv and otl. The sen- 

 tence thus furnishes a new illustration of the difHcultv, noted l)V 

 Aristotle, of phrasing Heraclitus. Diels mentions, but does not adopt, 

 my interpretation in V^. 



V^ 77, 19. Fr. 112, acocppoveli' aperrj fxeyio-rr], Kal ao({)Lr] dXr]dea Xtynv 

 Kal TroLtlv Kara 4>v(Ti.v eira'CovTas. 



The ]\Iss. here, as in fr. IIG, show aox^ipovtlv. Diels here substitutes 

 TO (ppovetv, there 4>povetv, in order to adapt the diction to that of He- 

 raclitus. He renders: "Das Denken ist der grosste Vorzug, und die 

 Weisheit bestcht darin, die Wahrheit zu sagen und nach der Natur zu 

 handeln, auf sie hinhorend." Besides changing aw4>povelv to to 4>poveiv, 

 he gives a forced rendering of dperij and eiratovTas which serves to 

 conceal the obvious Stoic character of the saying. Again, there is no 

 other instance of aocfyir] in the supposedly genuine fragments of 

 Heraclitus, who seems to have used (to) ao4>6v instead : it does recur 

 in fr. 129, Avhich Diels reckons doubtful or spurious but others accept 

 as genuine. Yet, granting that it is genuine, aocf)i-q there means some- 

 thing very different: it is, like ir6Xvp.a6elri and KaKOTexvl-q, a term 

 of reproach. One who reads the sentence without bias will readily 

 admit that dperTj means an ethical virtue. As for aXrjOea Xkyecv, one 

 may perhaps defend it by citing the denunciation of the \pev8ccu TtKrovas 

 Kal fjidpTvpas in fr. 28; but it is doubtful whether so obviously an 

 ethical virtue would have counted as a mark of ao4>ir] in the days 

 of Heraclitus. In opposition to this it may be said that 'AX-qdeia was 

 the ideal of the Greek philosophers from the beginning. True; but it 

 was objective Truth which they sought, and not the virtue of truth- 

 fulness. The juxtaposition of aXr]dea Xeyeiv and TroteTv /card 4>^^(xlv 

 does not suggest a reference to abstract or objecti\e truth. Finally, 

 ■KOielv Kara (f)V(TLv eiratovTas bears all the marks of Stoic doctrine; for 

 it is hardly defensible to render eratovTas with "auf sie hinhorend." 

 The worrl has here, as in fr. 117, ovk eTatoiv oKy I3aivei, the sense which 

 it regulaily bears in Plato, to wit, "knowing"; cp. Xen. Mem. 1. 1. 9, 

 baiiiovdv bi Kal tovs fiavTevopevovs a rots dvOpcoTrois oi deol fxadovai 

 biaKplvdLv. The words then clearly mean " to act in accordance with 



