700 PROCEEDINGS OF THE A^IERICAN ACADEMY. 



Aevo(f)aved re Kal 'EKaraTov), else Avould the champions of the new, 

 self-styled iaTopir] and Hesiod, their coryphaeus, have got under- 

 standing. The same pregnanc\' of meaning as in fr. 17 attaches to 

 jLvcoaKeLv in fr. 108, to be discussed more at length below, and in fr. 57, 

 where Heraclitus says that Hesiod, whom men regard as most knowing, 

 did not really comprehend {ovk eylvooaKev) day and night; for, contrary 

 to his opinion, they are one. It is thus clearly shown that by under- 

 standing Heraclitus means a cognitive faculty or act which penetrates 

 beyond superficial differences and distinctions, present to sense and 

 uncritical fancy, to an inner core of truth, and is characterized by 

 the apprehension of a fundamental unity. Again, the same point of 

 view finds expression in fr. 56, where he likens mankind, readily duped 

 when it comes to a true understanding of the surface show of things 

 {e^rjiraTrjVTaL ot audpcoTOL irpos Tr]v yvojcnv tojp (pavepojv), to Homer, who 

 could not read a foolish riddle propounded to him by gamins. Above, 

 in discussing fr. 18, 1 have already touched on fr. 86,d7rto-rtry diacjivyyaveL 

 p.i] ytyvwaKeadai, maintaining that Heraclitus meant to imply that the 

 true meaning of things is missed for want of a confident act of imagi- 

 native anticipation, whereby that which does not obtrude itself on our 

 senses is brought home to the understanding. It is perhaps not too 

 fanciful to detect the same distinction between sense and under- 

 standing, where understanding involves the synthesis of apperception, 

 in fr. 97, Kvves yap Karaf^av'^ovaLv S)v av /jltj ycvoja kooo-l. Heraclitus 

 would thus be merely repeating the distinction of Alcmaeon, fr. 1^ 

 (V^ 103, 25), avdpooTOP yap cfj-qcn tojv aWojv (sc. ^ci)cop) 8i.a(j)kpei.i' otl 

 IJLOvov ^vvirjat, ra 8' dXXa aiadaveTaL jiev, ov ^vpiriaL 5e. 



Returning now to fr. 41 after a considerable detour, we naturally 

 pause again before the phrase kirlaTaudaL yvCojjuqv, which is the real 

 crux. Scholars appear to be fairly unanimous in holding that, whether 

 it means " Vernunft," "Geist," or "thought," yuLop.r]u is an accusative 

 of the external object, being, in fact, the di\ine entity which rules 

 the world. Heraclitus 6 KVK-qrrjs does not much encourage fine dis- 

 tinctions, but to me this interpretation seems to yield a Stoic rather 

 than a Heraclitean thought. In obvious reminiscence of our frag- 

 ment and of fr. 32, eu to ao4>du ixovvov Xkyeadai ovk WeKei Kal edeXeL 

 Zrivos buofxa, Cleanthes, H. in lov. 30 could say, 



56s Se KvprjaaL 

 yviop.ris, fj Ti<JVP0s av diKrjs p-kra irapra Kv^epvas. 



But Cleanthes was clearly writing from a different, and a later, 

 point of view, for which the ovk edtXei of Heraclitus had no real 



