THE RELATION OF EVOLUTION TO MATERIALISM. 81 



domain of philosophy. But, on account of the strong tendency 

 to materialism and the skillful guidance of his leaders, there 

 seems to be no such boundary ; he does not distinguish between 

 the inductions of science and the inferences of a shallow philoso- 

 phy ; the whole is accredited to science, and the final conclusion 

 seems to carry with it all the certainty which belongs to scien- 

 tific results. The fact that these materialistic conclusions are 

 reached by some of the foremost scientists of the present day 

 adds nothing to their probability. In a question of science, viz., 

 the law of evolution, their authority is deservedly high, but in a 

 question of philosophy, viz., materialism, it is far otherwise. If 

 the pure scientists smile when theological philosophers, unac- 

 quainted with the methods of science, undertake to dogmatize on 

 the subject of evolution, they must pardon the philosophers if 

 they also smile when the pure scientists imagine that they can 

 at once solve questions in philosophy which have agitated the 

 human mind from the earliest times. I am anxious to show the 

 absurdity of this materialistic conclusion, but I shall try to do 

 so, not by any labored argument, but by a few simple illustra- 

 tions : 



1. It is curious to observe how, when the question is concern- 

 ing Nature, we no sooner find out how a thing is made than we 

 immediately exclaim, " It is not made at all — it became so of it- 

 self ! " So long as we knew not how worlds were made, we of 

 course concluded they must have been created ; but, so soon as 

 science showed Jiow it was probably done, immediately we say 

 we were mistaken — they were not made at all. So also, so long 

 as we could not imagine how new organic forms originated, we 

 were willing to believe they were created ; but, so soon as we find 

 that they originated by evolution, many at once say, " We were 

 mistaken — no creator is necessary at all." Is this so when the 

 question is concerning a work of man ? Yes, of one kind — viz., 

 the work of the magician. Here, indeed, we believe in him, and 

 are delighted with his work, until we know how it is done, and 

 then all our faith and wonder cease. But in any honest work it 

 is not so ; but, on the contrary, when we understand how it is 

 done, stupid wonder is changed into intellectual delight. Does 

 it not seem, then, that to most people God is a mere wonder- 

 worker, a chief magician ? But the mission of science is to show 

 us how things are done. Is it any wonder, then, that to such per- 

 sons science is constantly destroying their superstitious illu- 

 sions ? But if God is an honest worker, according to reason — 

 i. e., according to law — ought not science rather to change gap- 

 ing wonder into intelligent delight — superstition into rational 

 worship ? 



2. Again, it is curious to observe how an old truth, if it come 



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