LITERARY NOTICES. 



271 



between " Nature " and the " supernatural." 

 By the " supernatural " is commonly under- 

 stood a region beyond the visible universe 

 of law, peopled by arbitrary intelligences 

 which may descend into the natural order, 

 and interrupt its sequence, either for good 

 or for ill. Mr. Thompson's " supernatural," 

 on the contrary, is clearly neither more nor 

 less than the philosophical " unknowable " 

 — the ultimate mystery lying behind phe- 

 nomena, the only possible knowledge of 

 which is a negative apprehension. 



We might question also whether this 

 definition is sufficiently inclusive. How, 

 for example, can Mr. Thompson consistently 

 assign a religious chai-acter to positivism, 

 which finds its object of worship wholly 

 within the natural order of the world ; or 

 to Dr. Abbot's " scientific theism," which 

 rejects not only the popular notion of the 

 supernatural, but also the Spencerian " un- 

 knowable," basing its worship upon the 

 knowledge of an infinitely relational and 

 absolutely knowable universe ? Mr. Thomp- 

 son, indeed, appai-ently recognizes positiv- 

 ism as " the religion of social immortali- 

 ty," asserting that " the doctrine of deity 

 characteristically belonging to this system 

 of belief is essentially pantheistic." Comte- 

 ism, however, expressly repudiates all cos- 

 mic implications in the object of its wor- 

 ship — its Grand Etre being simply organic 

 humanity. Even pantheism, as limited to 

 the Cosmos, does not imply supernatural- 

 ism. Eathcr, as in the words of Goethe, it 

 repudiates it : 



" What were the God who sat outside to scan 

 The spheres that 'nealh his finger circling ran ? 

 God dwells within, nud moves the world and 



molds, 

 Himself and Nature in one form infolds." 



Mr. Thompson argues, indeed, with great 

 acuteness and force, that " a postulated su- 

 pernatural is conditional for all knowledge 

 whatsoever." Those who accept his psy- 

 chology will doubtless assent to this state- 

 ment. A primary definition of religion, 

 however, it would appear to us, should be 

 broad enough to cover all philosophical the- 

 ories. 



Parts I and II (" Religion and Religious 

 Sentiments," and " Religious Sentiments in 

 Relation to Knowledge") are devoted chiefly 

 to definition, preliminary explanation, and 

 the development of the psychological basis 



of the argument. As this has been treated 

 in extenso in the author's " System of Psy- 

 chology," it does not call for special eluci- 

 dation here. Throughout life, he argues, 

 the ego perceives that its activity is neces- 

 sarily limited. Beyond the limit the con- 

 sciousness posits a somewhat which is real, 

 yet incomprehensible. Thus arises the idea 

 of the supernatural (unknowable). To the 

 questions why ? whence ? and whither ? 

 which it suggests, we can find no adequate 

 solution. Attempting to make the super- 

 natural the object of thought, we find that 

 we can only do so by ascribing to it the at- 

 tributes of Nature. Thus, we form sym- 

 bolical notions of it which vary with chang- 

 ing conditions of mental development. So 

 arise anthropomorphic conceptions of su- 

 pernatural beings, ideas of heaven and hell, 

 the assumed connection of supernatural in- 

 telligences with natural phenomena, etc. 

 This belief in supernatural interference in- 

 duces fear, impels worship, and influences 

 conduct. 



Our author ranks polytheism above mon- 

 otheism as an incentive to intellectual and 

 sociaj progress. The latter is autocratic 

 and subverts the individual judgment. The 

 former, aristocratic in its nature, stimulates 

 thought and encourages literature and art. 

 Christianity, with its Trinity and angelic 

 hierarchy, he regards as a polytheistic rath- 

 er than a monotheistic faith. Pantheism is 

 democratic, and favors the free develop- 

 ment of the individual reason. Between 

 these different conceptions of the super- 

 natural, truth furnishes no criterion of judg- 

 ment. We can affirm of neither of them 

 anything more than its probability. 



In the chapter on " The Continuity of 

 Personality," Mr. Thompson argues from 

 scientific and psychological analogies in fa- 

 vor of a future life. Admitting that the 

 subject is beset with difficulties, he inclines 

 to the opinion that " the ground for the as- 

 sertion of post-mortem personal self-con- 

 sciousness in identity with ante-mortem self- 

 consciousness is firmer than the contrary be- 

 lief." A future life implies social relations, 

 and the hypothesis of the separation of the 

 good from the evil, with the final reclama- 

 tion of the latter, seems reasonable. Our 

 author furnishes no theories of his own 

 concerning the nature or location of the 

 supernatural world. In Part III (" Religious 



