THE TEACHING OF PSYCHOLOGY. 339 



some fasiiion, two lives, and the hypothesis dreamed of by Pascal 

 i^ very near to being realized : " If we dreamed every night the 

 same things, it would affect us as much as objects that we see every 

 day ; and if an artisan were sure to dream during the twelve hours 

 of every night that he was a king, I believe that he would be 

 almost as happy as a king who should dream for twelve hours 

 that he was an artisan," Pascal speaks here only of dreaming, but 

 it must not be forgotten that somnambulism is composed both of 

 dream and reality. The somnambulist performs actions that take 

 place in the real world ; he walks, he writes, he does nearly every- 

 thing that he does while awake, and is even able to speak and 

 reply. Hence we have only to represent to ourselves somnambu- 

 lism gaining more and more upon the waking condition, encroach- 

 ing upon it, and at last becoming a second waking alternating 

 with the other, and retaining only one feature of somnambulism — 

 the loss of recollection on waking. Take the case of Felida, the 

 celebrated subject on whom this double personality was observed 

 for the first time. She (who I believe is still living) has two suc- 

 ceeding and alternating existences, in each of Avhich she has a 

 different character and different trains of thought ; but above all 

 remains the characteristic fact that, in the part of her life that cor- 

 responds with the former normal condition (for we can now hardly 

 detect a difference between the two states), she does not recollect 

 from her other existence, while in the latter she often remembers 

 from the former. From this we have the expressions secondary 

 condition applied to the second waking, and primary condition 

 applied to the first waking, or original normal state. There are 

 then two selves superposed in a fashion and alternating with one 

 another. If at any moment the memory should disappear from 

 the former state, the rupture would be absolute, and we should be 

 in the situation imagined by Leibnitz * : "If we could suppose 

 that two separate, distinct, and incommunicable consciousnesses 

 were acting by turns in the same body, the one during the day 

 and the other during the night, I ask if, in such a case, the man 

 of the day and the man of the night would not be two persons as 

 distinct as Socrates and Plato ? " 



To the phenomena of succession, are added those of simultane- 

 ous doubling of the personality. M. Taine cites an example of 

 this in his work on " Intelligence," from the observations of Dr. 

 Krishaben. A patient had lost the consciousness of his own exist- 

 ence, and had afterward reached the feeling that he was some 

 other one than himself. " It seemed to me," he said, speaking of 

 his first state, " that I was no longer of this world, that I no longer 

 existed ; but I had not then the feeling of being another." Of the 



* The hypothesis is really not by Leibnitz, but by Locke, and Leibnitz has only repro- 

 duced it in his " Nouveaux Essais." 



