THE ETHICS OF KANT. 471 



"A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects, nor by its 

 aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the voli- 

 tion, that is, it is good in itself, and considered by itself is to be esteemed much 

 higher than all that can be brought about by it in favor of any inclination, nay 

 even of the sum total of all inclinations." 



Most fallacies result from the habit of using words without fully- 

 rendering them into thoughts — passing them by with recognitions 

 of their meanings as ordinarily used, without stopping to consider 

 whether these meanings admit of being given to them in the cases 

 named. Let us not rest satisfied with thinking vaguely of what 

 is understood by " a Good Will/' but let us interpret the words 

 definitely. Will implies the consciousness of some end to be 

 achieved. Exclude from it every idea of purpose, and the con- 

 ception of Will disappears. An end of some kind being neces- 

 sarily implied by the conception of Will, the quality of the Will 

 is determined by the quality of the end contemplated. Will itself, 

 considered apart from any distinguishing epithet, is not cogniza- 

 ble by Morality at all. It becomes cognizable by Morality only 

 when it gains its character as good or bad by virtue of its con- 

 templated end as good or bad. If any one doubts this, let him 

 try whether he can think of a good will which contemplates a bad 

 end. The whole question, therefore, centers in the meaning of 

 the word good. Let us look at the meanings habitually given 

 to it. 



We speak of good meat, good bread, good wine; by which 

 phrases we mean either things that are palatable, and so give 

 pleasure, or things that are wholesome, and by conducing to 

 health conduce to pleasure. A good fire, good clothing, a good 

 house, we so name because they minister either to comfort, which 

 means pleasure, or gratify the aesthetic sentiment, which also 

 means pleasure. So it is with things which more indirectly 

 further welfare, as good tools or good roads. When we speak of 

 a good workman, a good teacher, a good doctor, it is the same : 

 efficiency in aiding others' well-being is what we indirectly mean. 

 Yet again, good government, good institutions, good laws, con- 

 note benefits yielded to the society in which they exist : benefits 

 being equivalent to certain kinds of happiness, positive or nega- 

 tive. But Kant tells us that a good will is one that is good in 

 and for itself without reference to ends. We are not to think of 

 it as prompting acts which will profit the man himself, either by 

 conducing to his health, advancing his culture, or improving his 

 inclinations ; for all these are in the long run conducive to happi- 

 ness, and are urged only for the reason that they do this. We 

 are not to think of a will as good because, by fulfillment of it, 

 friends are saved from sufferings or have their gratifications 

 increased ; for this would involve calling it good because of bene- 



