472 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



ficial ends in view. Nor must conduciveness to social ameliora- 

 tions, present or future, be taken into account when we attempt 

 to conceive a good will. In short we are to frame our idea of a 

 good will without any material out of which to frame the idea 

 of good : good is to be used in thought as an eviscerated term. 



Here, then, we have illustrated what I have called above the 

 inverted a priori method of philosophizing : the setting out with 

 an inconceivable proposition. The Kantian Metaphysics starts 

 by asserting that Space is " nothing but " a form of intuition — 

 pertains wholly to the subject and not at all to the object. This 

 is a verbally intelligible proposition but one of which the terms 

 can not be put together in consciousness ; for neither Kant, nor 

 any one else, has ever succeeded in bringing into unity of repre- 

 sentation the thought of Space and the thought of Self, as being 

 the one an attribute of the other. And here we see that, just in 

 the same way, the Kantian Ethics begins by positing something 

 which seems to have a meaning but which has really no meaning 

 — something which, under the conditions imposed, can not be ren- 

 dered into thought at all. For neither he, nor any one else, ever 

 has or ever can, frame a consciousness of a good will when from 

 the word good are expelled all thoughts of those ends which we 

 distinguish by the word good. 



Evidently Kant himself sees that his assumption invites attack, 

 for he proceeds to defend it. He says : 



"There is, however, something so strange in this idea of the ahsolute value of 

 the mere vrill, in which no account is taken of its utility, that notwithstanding 

 the thorough assent of even common reason to the idea, [!] yet a suspicion must 

 arise that it may perhaps really be the product of high-flown fancy, &c." (p. 13). 



And then to prepare for a justification, he goes on to say : 



" In the physical constitution of an organized being we assume it as a funda- 

 mental principle that no organ for any purpose will be found in it but what is also 

 the fittest and best adapted for that purpose " (pp. 13-14). 



Now, even had this assumption been valid, the argument based 

 upon it, far-fetched as it is, might be considered of very inade- 

 quate strength to warrant the supposition that there can be a will 

 conceived as good without any reference to good ends. But, un- 

 fortunately for Kant, the assumption is utterly invalid. In his 

 day, it probably passed without question ; but in our day, few if 

 any biologists would admit it. On the special-creation hypothesis 

 some defense of the proposition might be attempted, but the evo- 

 lution hypothesis tacitly negatives it entirely. Let us begin with 

 some minor facts which militate against Kant's supposition. Take 

 first rudimentary organs. These are numerous throughout the 

 animal kingdom. While representing organs which were of use 



