ORIGIN OF THE SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY. 35 



ism " ; but if Mr. Harrison will refer to " Social Statics," p. 443 and p. 

 453, he will find it used at a time when, as I have said, Comte was to me 

 but a name. If Mr. Harrison alleges that anybody who writes about 

 Social Evolution (in past days called Social Progress) must be indebted 

 for the idea to Comte, he is simply illustrating afresh that which all 

 observers are now remarking, that he and his co-disciples find Comte 

 everywhere. As to " Social Environment," I have, I believe, occasion- 

 ally used the expression ; but it makes so little figure that I should be 

 puzzled where to look for it. That the name Sociology was introduced 

 by Comte is doubtless true, and that I have avowedly adopted it is 

 also true : true also that I have been blamed for using this hybrid 

 word. But though the word is his, the idea is not. In its crude form 

 it can be traced as far back as Plato ; and long before the time of Comte 

 it assumed a considerable development in the work of Vico — " Scienza 

 Nuova." 



" The conception that all things social are amenable to invariable 

 laws and have modes of life analogous to those of physical organisms 

 is one of the most transcendent steps taken in modern thought," says 

 Mr. Harrison. To the first of these statements I have to reply, that if 

 Mr. Harrison will refer to a pamphlet on " The Proper Sphere of Gov- 

 ernment," written by me when twenty-two, he will find this same con- 

 ception distinctly expressed and argued from. And to the second I 

 have to reply, 1. That the analogy between the individual organism 

 and the social organism is traceable in Greek thought ; and, 2. That it 

 was set forth elaborately, though very erroneously, by Hobbes. To 

 say that " Comte is the unquestioned author of the thought " illus- 

 trates afresh the way in which his disciples are possessed by him. 



The adoption of the word " Altruism " from Comte is referred 

 to by Mr. Harrison. Here he is perfectly right. I have acknowl- 

 edged the adoption ; and I have also defended it as a very useful 

 word. 



Mr. Harrison claims for Comte the distinction between the militant 

 phase of social life and the industrial phase. Is he sure that no one 

 recognized it before ? But that I do not owe the conception to him is 

 again sufficiently shown by reference to " Social Statics," pp. 419-434 

 (original edition), where the essentially different traits of predatory 

 societies and peaceful societies are contrasted, though the words " in- 

 dustrial " and " militant " are not used. Moreover, Comte's concep- 

 tion and mine, respecting the types of social organization proper to 

 the two, are radically opposed. 



In the "Principles of Biology," vol. i, p. 74, is a note Avhich, by 

 implication, refutes the statement that I owe the definition of life to 

 Comte. Comte evidently made in the " Positive Philosophy " an ap- 

 proach to the truth, but he strangely missed it. How little he himself 

 regarded what he there said as a definition of life is proved by the 

 fact that he adopted De Blainville's definition. Dr. Bridges says he 



