34 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



I pointed to the essays in which were contained the idees-m^res of 

 the Synthetic Philosophy, and gave Mr. Harrison means of finding 

 that they were undeniably such by referring him to parts of " First 

 Principles," in which they were developed ; and I then invited him to 

 point out the ideas in the Positive Philosophy from which they were 

 derived. Instead of taking this direct way of establishing filiation, he 

 has sought to establish it in various indirect ways. 



He contends that I owe the conception of a " coherent body of doc- 

 trine," formed by "the amalgamation of Science, Philosophy, and Re- 

 ligion," to Comte. If he will turn to the Essay on " The Genesis of 

 Science," he will see that my criticism of Comte's Classification of the 

 Sciences is preceded by a criticism of the schemes of Oken and Hegel, 

 both of which profess to be coherent bodies of doctrine formed of Phi- 

 losophy and the Sciences. Having the three schemes before me, why 

 does Mr, Harrison suppose that Comte, rather than Hegel or Oken, 

 gave me the idea ? And why should I not say that Comte was in- 

 debted to them, just as others say he was indebted for his idees-7neres 

 to St. Simon ? 



He refers to my first work, " Social Statics," as being identical in 

 title with one by Comte. In the pamphlet issued twenty years ago, 

 discussing the question now again raised, I stated that at the close of 

 1850, when "Social Statics" was published, Comte was to me but a 

 name. It seems that Mr. Harrison did not believe me. There are va- 

 rious proofs, however. Though I have letters showing that " Social 

 Statics " was not the title originally intended, this evidence must be 

 left out, being too long to quote. But there is the sub-title, " The Con- 

 ditions Essential to Human Happiness Specified, and the First of them 

 Developed." Does this correspond with the substance of Comte's " So- 

 cial Statics " ? Further still, there is the fact, named in the pamphlet 

 above mentioned, that I was blamed by a reviewer of " Social Statics " 

 in the "North British Review" (August, 1851) because I did not 

 " seem to have the slightest notion " of that which Comte understood 

 by Social Statics. And, once more, there is the fact that the ideas and 

 spirit of the book are as utterly alien to those of Comte as can well be. 

 They involve a pronounced individualism, which was one of his aver- 

 sions. 



Because Comte here and there speaks of " synthesis," Mr. Harrison 

 thinks that the title Synthetic Philosophy was derived from him. If 

 he will refer to the programme as originally given, and as continued for 

 ten years or more, he will see that no such title was used. My adop- 

 tion of it was due simply to the fact that there had been given to the 

 system by my American adherent, Mr. Fiske, the title " Cosmic Phi- 

 losophy " — a title which I disapproved. 



Mr. Harrison says, "Mr. Spencer has written volumes about the 

 'Social Organism,' ' Social Evolution,' 'Social Environment'; so has 

 Comte." I did not know Comte had used the phrase " Social Organ- 



