EDITOR'S TABLE. 



127 



reason and affect the conduct. To inter- 

 pret and employ language, even witli those 

 who think themselves employed about facts, 

 is consequently one of the chief occupations 

 of all those who have power with their fellow- 

 men, whether their sphere of thought is ma- 

 terial or spiritual ' things.' The pretended 

 contrast between thought and words is not 

 valid, especially when used for so sweeping 

 an induction as that made by Professors 

 Cooke and Youmans or President Eliot." 



The contrast between -words and 

 things is certainly not a pretense but a 

 reality ; and we are unable to see how 

 the validity of the induction in this 

 case is in any way dependent upon the 

 sweepof its application. It is claimed by 

 nobody in this controversy that words 

 are unimportant or that language-stud- 

 ies are not of great value; but it is 

 maintained that the things represented 

 are more important than their signs, 

 and Nature-studies of higher value than 

 lingual studies, and the whole issue 

 turns upou the recognition of this fact. 

 Historically, this contrast has been 

 proved to be profound and momentous. 

 In the pre-scientific ages, words were 

 not only put in the place of things, but 

 confounded with them so as to vitiate 

 whole systems of thought as shown in 

 the history of Greek speculation and 

 the scholasticism of the middle ages. 

 The investigation of truth was made to 

 consist in mere verbal manipulations. 

 The Baconian reform in philosophy 

 consisted in demanding tliat the human 

 mind shall no longer occupy itself in the 

 verbal sphere, but shall break through 

 the barriers of words and study the 

 things they represent. The inductive 

 philosophy began with facts — the obser- 

 vation and investigation of things — and 

 was a new method which has revolu- 

 tionized knowledge, created the mod- 

 ern sciences, and revealed the order of 

 Nature. It is contrasted with verbal 

 and literary studies, which accept com- 

 mon notions — the loose, vague, crude 

 ideas of ordinary experience— and can 

 not advance and perfect knowledge be- 

 cause it refuses to make facts first and 



to exercise the mind in their close 

 and careful study. Is a contrast so 

 broad as this, between a fruitless 

 method which kept the mind station- 

 ary for centuries and a method so 

 fruitful as to give origin to a vast body 

 of accurate and productive truth, to 

 be regarded as a pretense when it is 

 claimed to be fundamental in education ? 

 The verbal system is historic, tradition- 

 al, popular, and all-prevalent in our sys- 

 tems of mental cultivation. It is pro- 

 posed by the reformers not to destroy 

 it, but to reduce its exaggerated pro- 

 portions, and give greater prominence 

 to the systematic study of actual things. 

 The demand is that there shall be a new 

 discipline in education, begun early and 

 pursued thoroughly, by the mastery of 

 given branches of science at first hand. 

 The contrast between words and things 

 must be at any rate held valid for the 

 accomplishment of this reasonable ob- 

 ject. That this claim is a moderate and 

 sober one, and has long been firmly held 

 by educators of the highest character, 

 might be shown by quotations from 

 many authorities ; Dr. William Whewell 

 thus remarks upon it : 



Of the mode in which this culture of the 

 inductive habit of mind, or at least apprecia- 

 tion of the method and its results, is to be 

 promoted — if 1 might presume to give an 

 opinion — I should say that one obvious mode 

 of effecting this discipline of the mind in in- 

 duction is, the exact and solid study of some 

 portion of inductive knowledge. I do not 

 mean the mechanical sciences alone, physical 

 astronomy and the like, though these un- 

 doubtedly have a prerogative value as the 

 instruments of such a culture ; but the like 

 effect will be promoted by the exact and solid 

 study of any portion of the circle of natural 

 sciences ; botany, comparative anatomy, ge- 

 ology, chemistry, for instance. But I say the 

 exact and solid knowledge ; not a mere ver- 

 bal knowledge, but a knowledge which is real 

 in its character, though it may be elementary 

 and limited in its extent. The knowledge of 

 which I speak must be a knowlednfc of things, 

 and not merely of names of things ; an ac- 

 quaintance with the operations and produc- 

 tions of Nature, as they appear to the eye, 

 not merely an acquaintance with what has 



