AGNOSTIC METAPHYSICS. 305 



Ultimate Cause. The objections he states to the idea of Creation are 

 not removed by talking of a Creative Power rather than a Creator 

 God. If Mr. Spencer's new Creative Power "stands towards our gen- 

 eral conception of things in substantially the same relation as the 

 Creative Power of Theology," it is open to all the metaphysical dilem- 

 mas so admirably stated in " First Principles." Mr. Spencer can not 

 have it both ways. If his Unknowable be the Creative Power and 

 Ultimate Cause, it simply renews all the mystification of the old the- 

 ologies. If his Unknowable be unknowable, then it is idle to talk of 

 Infinite and Eternal Energy, sole Reality, All-Being, and Creative 

 Power. This is the slip-slop of theologians which Mr. Spencer, as 

 much as any man living, has finally torn to shreds. 



In what way does the notion of Ultimate Cause avoid the difficul- 

 ties in the way of First Cause, and how is Creative Power an idea more 

 logical than Creator? And if, as Mr. Spencer says ("First Principles," 

 p. 35), " the three different suppositions respecting the origin of things 

 turn out to be literally unthinkable," what does he mean by asserting 

 that a Creative Power is the one great Reality ? Mr. Spencer seems 

 to suggest that, though all idea of First Cause, of Creator, of Absolute 

 Existence is unthinkable, the difficulty in the way of predicating them 

 of anything is got over by asserting that the unthinkable and the un- 

 knowable is the ultimate reality. He said (" First Principles," p. 110), 

 " every supposition respecting the genesis of the Universe commits us 

 to alternative impossibilities of thought ; " and again, " w^e are not per- 

 mitted to know — nay, we are not even permitted to conceive — that 

 Reality which is behind the veil of Appearance." Quite so ! On that 

 ground we have long rested firmly, accepting Mr. Spencer's teaching. 

 It is to violate that rule if we now go on to call it Creative Power, 

 Ultimate Cause, and the rest. It comes then to this : Mr. Spencer 

 says to the theologians, "I can not allow you to speak of a First 

 Cause, or a Creator, or an All-Being, or an Absolute Existence, be- 

 cause you mean something intelligible and conceivable by these terms, 

 and I tell you that they stand for ideas that are unthinkable and in- 

 conceivable. But," he adds, "I have a perfect right to talk of an 

 Ultimate Cause and a Creative Power, and an Absolute Existence, 

 and an All-Being, because I mean nothing by these terms — at least, 

 nothing that can be either thought of or conceived of, and I know 

 that I am not talking of anything intelligible or conceivable. That is 

 the faith of an Agnostic, which except a man believe faithfully he can 

 not be saved." 



Beyond the region of the knowable and the conceivable we have 

 no right to assume an infinite energy more than an infinite series of 

 energies, or an infinite series of infinite things or nothings. We have 

 no right to assume one Ultimate Cause, or any cause, more than an 

 infinite series of Causes, or something which is not Cause at all. We 

 have no right to assume that anything beyond the knowable is eternal 



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