LAST WORDS ABOUT AGNOSTICISM. 319 



relation has not simply magnitude having no known limits, and duration of 

 which neither beginning nor end is cognizable, but is also an existence not to 

 be defined? In other words, what must happen if one term of the relation is 

 not only quantitatively but also qualitatively unrepresentable ? Clearly in this 

 case the relation does not simply cease to be thinkable except as a relation of a 

 certain class, but it lapses completely. When one of the terms becomes wholly 

 unknowable, the law of thought can no longer be conformed to; both because 

 one term can not be present, and because relation itself can not be framed. . . . 

 In brief, then, to Mr. Martineau's objection I reply, that the insoluble difficulties 

 he indicates arise here, as elsewhere, when thought is applied to that which 

 transcends the sphere of thought ; and that just as when we try to pass beyond 

 phenomenal manifestations to the Ultimate Reality manifested, we have to sym- 

 bolize it out of such materials as the phenomenal manifestations give us ; so we 

 have simultaneously to symbolize the connection between this Ultimate Reality 

 and its manifestations, as somehow allied to the connections among the phenome- 

 nal manifestations themselves. The truth Mr. Martineau's criticism adumbrates, 

 is that the law of thought fails where the elements of thought fail ; and this is a 

 conclusion quite conformable to the general view I defend. Still holding the 

 validity of my argument against Hamilton and Mansel, that in pursuance of 

 their own principle the Relative is not at all thinkable as such, unless in contra- 

 distinction to some existence posited, however vaguely, as the other term of 

 a relation, conceived however indefinitely ; it is consistent on my part to hold 

 that in this effort which thought inevitably makes to pass beyond its sphere, not 

 only does the product of thought become a dim symbol of a product, but the 

 process of thought becomes a dim symbol of a process; and hence any predica- 

 ment inferable from the law of thought can not be asserted.* 



Thus then criticisms like this of Mr. Martineau, often recurring in 

 one shape or other, and now again made by Mr. Harrison, do not show 

 the invalidity of my argument, but once more show the imbecility of 

 human intelligence when brought to bear on the ultimate question. 

 Phenomenon without noumenon is unthinkable ; and yet noumenon 

 can not be thought of in the true sense of thinking. We are at once 

 obliged to be conscious of a reality behind appearance, and yet can 

 neither bring this consciousness of reality into any shape, nor can 

 bring into any shape its connection with appearance. The forms of 

 our thought, moulded on experiences of phenomena, as well as the con- 

 notations of our words formed to express the relations of phenomena, 

 involve us in contradictions when we try to think of that which is be- 

 yond phenomena ; and yet the existence of that which is beyond phe- 

 nomena is a necessary datum alike of our thoughts and our words. We 

 have no choice but to accept a formless consciousness of the inscrutable. 



I can not treat with fulness the many remaining issues. To Mr. 

 Harrison's statement that it was uncandid in me to implicate him with 

 the absurdities of the Comtean belief and ritual, notwithstandins: his 

 public utterances, I reply that whereas ten years ago I was led to think 

 he gave but a qualified adhesion to Comte's religious doctrine, such 



* " Essays," vol. iii, pp. 293-296. 



