6o8 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



presiding, the jury rendered a verdict of acquittal on the ground of 

 unsound mind ; but no medical expert bad testified that Cole was in- 

 sane. In the course of my examination as an expert witness, the court 

 asked me whether I thought " that Cole, at the time he committed the 

 act for which he was under trial, knew the difference between right 

 and wrong, and that the act was in violation of the law." To which I 

 replied in effect that " Cole, being suddenly confronted by the man 

 who had wronged him, did not probably consider whether the act 

 which he was about to commit was in violation of the law or not." If 

 the jury made use of this reply to pronounce him insane, the responsi- 

 bility of their verdict does not rest upon me. Their verdict of " un- 

 sound mind " was given, as it has been in many similar cases, because 

 they did not think he ought to be punished for the act, and they were 

 quite willing to give a very broad and partial interpretation to any 

 testimony which in the remotest degree seemed to favor the defense. 

 Subsequently, from several sources, I learned that my testimony, in- 

 ferred only from the verdict, had been subjected to criticism. 



The question put to me by the judge, although not so broad as 

 it is usxially made, no doubt had in view the legal definition or tests 

 of unsound mind, and which, with a few slight modifications, has 

 been incorporated into most systems of jurisprudence. But no legal 

 definition of unsound mind can ever be properly made ; and for the 

 simple reason that no scientific definition is possible. The latter 

 fact has generally been admitted by writers upon mental disease ; 

 but, nevertheless, they have often attempted to make what they are 

 pleased to term approximate definitions, for the purpose, as they have 

 declared, of furnishing at least a guide in the proper direction. Upon 

 these approximate definitions the law-makers have constructed their 

 legal definitions or tests ; no longer intended as guides simply, but 

 as authoritative and sharply defined distinctions, which the courts are 

 compelled to recognize. Whether these tests be applied in a scien- 

 tific or legal sense, they are in my opinion unsound, unjust, and con- 

 fusing ; they are calculated to mislead the judgment rather than to 

 direct it to a proper conclusion. They ought, therefore, to be aban- 

 doned, and the whole matter left to the common sense of the jurors, 

 aided and enlightened by the testimony, the arguments of the coun- 

 sel, and the exposition of the courts. 



4. "While, in what I have said, I trust I have shown a purpose to 

 defend ray professional brethren, when appearing in the role of ex- 

 perts in lunacy, against unjust criticism, by maintaining the undeni- 

 able proposition that, other things being equal, they are the most 

 trustworthy witnesses, I am at the same time prepared to say that 

 they are not the only persons or classes of persons whose opinions as 

 experts may be valuable in matters of this sort, or whose opinions 

 might not, in some cases, be safely substituted for their own. 



In reference to questions of sanity or insanity, most men of intelli- 



