THE SINS OF LEGISLATORS. 3 



ing shown that in mediaeval Europe the right of private war among 

 members of the military order was brought to an end, not because the 

 head ruler thought it his duty to arbitrate, but because private wars 

 interfered with the efficiency of his army in public wars — having 

 shown that the administration of justice long continued to display in 

 large measure its primitive nature in trial by battle, carried on before 

 the king or his deputy as umpire, and which among ourselves con- 

 tinued nominally to be an alternative form of trial down to 1819, it 

 might then be pointed out that even now there survives trial by battle 

 under another form : counsel being the champions and purses the 

 weapons. In civil cases the ruling agency cares scarcely more than of 

 old about rectifying the wrongs of the injured ; but, practically, its 

 deputy does little more than to enforce the rules of the fight : the 

 result being less a question of equity than a question of pecuniary 

 ability and forensic skill. Nay, so little concern for the administra- 

 tion of justice is shown by the ruling agency, that when, by legal con- 

 flict carried on in presence of its deputy, the combatants have been 

 pecuniarily bled even to the extent of producing prostration, and 

 when, an appeal being made by one of them, the decision is reversed, 

 the beaten combatant is made to pay for the blunders of the deputy 

 or a preceding deputy ; and not unfrequently the wronged man, who 

 sought protection or restitution, is taken out of court pecuniarily 

 dead. 



Adequately done, such a portrayal of governmental misdeeds of 

 commission and omission, proving that the partially surviving code of 

 ethics arising in and proper to a state of war still vitiates govern- 

 Inental action, might greatly moderate the hopes of those who are 

 anxious to extend governmental control. 



But leaving out the greater part of the large topic comprehended 

 under the title of this article, I propose here to deal only with a com- 

 paratively small remaining part — those sins of legislators which are 

 not generated by personal ambitions or class interests, but result from 

 a lack of the study by which legislators are morally bound to prepare 

 themselves. 



A druggist's assistant who, after listening to the description of 

 pains which he mistakes for those of colic, but which are really caused 

 by inflammation of the caecum, prescribes a sharp purgative and kills 

 the patient, is found guilty of manslaughter. He is not allowed to 

 excuse himself on the ground that he did not intend harm, but hoped 

 for good. The plea that he simply made a mistake in his diagnosis is 

 not entertained. He is told that he had no right to risk disastrous 

 consequences by meddling in a matter concerning which his knowledge 

 was so inadequate. The fact that he was ignorant how great was his 

 ignorance is not accepted in bar of judgment. It is tacitly assumed 

 that the experience common to all should have taught him that even 



