294 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



powers, still more is there likely to exist such a confusion where there 

 has been no such deed of incorporation. But the same principle holds. 

 I again emphasize the proposition that the members of an incorporated 

 body are bound "severally to submit to the will of the majority in all 

 iinatters concerning the fulfillment of the objects for lohich they are in- 

 corporated, hut in no others. And I contend that this holds of an in- 

 corporated nation as much as of an incorporated company. 



" Yes, but," comes the obvious rejoinder, " as there is no deed by 

 which the members of a nation are incorporated — as there neither is, 

 nor ever was, a specification of purposes for which the union was 

 formed, there exist no limits ; and, consequently, the power of the ma- 

 jority is unlimited." 



Evidently it must be admitted that the hypothesis of a social con- 

 tract, either under the shape assumed by Hobbes, or under the shape 

 assumed by Rousseau, is baseless. Nay, more, it must be admitted 

 that even had such a contract once been formed, it could not be bind- 

 ing on the posterity of those who formed it. Moreover, if any say 

 that in the absence of those limitations to its powers which a deed of 

 incorporation might imply, there is nothing to prevent a majority from 

 imposing its will on a minority by force, assent must be given — an 

 assent, however, joined with the comment that if the superior force of 

 the majority is its justification, then the superior force of a despot 

 backed by an adequate army, is also justified : the problem lapses. 

 "What we here seek is some higher warrant for the subordination of 

 minority to majority than that arising from inability to resist physi- 

 cal coercion. Even Austin, anxious as he is to establish the unques- 

 tionable authority of positive law, and assuming, as he does, an abso- 

 lute sovereignty of some kind, monarchic, aristocratic, constitutional, 

 or popular, as the source of its unquestionable authority, is obliged, in 

 the last resort, to admit a moral limit to its action over the commu- 

 nity. While insisting, in pursuance of his rigid theory of sovereignty, 

 that a sovereign body originating from the people " is legally free to 

 abridge their political liberty at its own pleasure or discretion," he al- 

 lows that " a government may be hindered by positive morality from 

 abridging the political liberty which it leaves or grants to its sub- 

 jects," * Hence, we have to find, not a physical justification, but a 

 moral justification, for the supposed absolute power of the majority. 



This will at once draw forth the rejoinder, " Of course, in the ab- 

 sence of any agreement, with its implied limitations, the rule of the 

 majority is unlimited ; because it is more just that the majority should 

 have its way than that the minority should have its way." A very 

 reasonable rejoinder this seems until there comes the re-rejoinder. We 

 may oppose to it the equally tenable proposition that, in the absence 

 of an agreement, the sui:)remacy of a majority over a minority does 

 not exist at all. It is co-operation of some kind, from which there arise 

 * "The Province of Jurisprudence DetGrmiaed" (second edition), p. 241. 



