296 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



nance of his life, and to preserve intact his powers both of using these 

 material things and getting further such. It is obvious to him that 

 he can not do this if he acts alone. Against foreign invaders he is 

 powerless unless he combines with his fellows ; and the business of 

 protecting himself against domestic invaders if he did not similarly 

 combine, would be alike onerous, dangerous, and inefficient. That is 

 to say, in respect of all measures for maintaining those conditions 

 under which only the business of life can be carried on and its satis- 

 factions obtained, every one will agree to co-operate ; and, by im- 

 plication, will agree to submit to the majority on all questions thence 

 arising. 



Details are not needful here ; nor is it needful to discuss that bor- 

 der region lying between these classes of cases, and to say how much 

 is included in the last and how much is excluded with the first. For 

 the present purpose, it is sufficient to recognize the undeniable truth 

 that there are numerous kinds of actions in respect of which men would 

 not, if they were asked, agree with anything like unanimity to be 

 bound by the will of the majority ; while there are some kinds of 

 actions in respect of which they would almost unanimously agree to 

 be thus bound. Here, then, we find a definite warrant for enforcing 

 the will of the majority within certain limits, and a definite warrant 

 for denying the authority of its will beyond those limits. 



But evidently, when analyzed, the question resolves itself into the 

 further question. What are the relative claims of the aggregate and 

 of its units? Are the rights of the community universally valid 

 against the individual? or has the individual some rights which are 

 valid against the community? The judgment given on this point 

 underlies the entire fabric of political convictions formed, and more 

 especially those convictions which concern the proper sphere of gov- 

 ernment. Here, then, I propose to revive a dormant controversy, with 

 the expectation of reaching a different conclusion from that which is 

 fashionable. 



Says Professor Jevons, in his work, "The State in Relation to 

 Labor " — " The first step must be to rid our minds of the idea that 

 there are any such things in social matters as abstract rights." Of 

 like character is the belief expressed by Mr. Matthew Ai-nold, in his 

 article on copyright : " An author has no natural right to a property 

 in his production. But then neither has he a natural right to anything 

 whatever which he may produce or acquire." * So, too, I recently 

 read in a weekly journal of high repute, that " to explain once more 

 that there is no such thing as ' natural right ' would be a waste of 

 philosophy." And the view expressed in these extracts is commonly 

 uttered by statesmen and lawyers in a way implying that only the un- 

 thinking masses hold any other. 



* "Fortnightly Review," ia 1880, vol. xxvii, p. 322. 



