138 SCIENCE PROGRESS 



presumably sense and apprehend essentially the same world of separated 

 bodies in space and time as we do. But it seems obvious, if we are constrained 

 by a mental habit to model our conceptions on the world of things as it 

 happens to appear to us, that we ought to consult this habit and carefully 

 consider it before permitting it to commit us to any " concept of nature." 

 It certainly seems strange for us to be asked to substitute, as the 

 fundamental cosmic unit, the event for the substantial body in space and 

 time and simultaneously warned not to consider mental procedure as a factor 

 in our experience. Our thought about nature is certainly controlled by an 

 analogical mental habit ; in our common-sense, spontaneous, and habitual 

 estimate of the world we are certainly presented with substantial bodies, 

 framed in space and time, as a model of reality. We are compelled, if we 

 desire a " concept of nature," to remember our minds with their methods 

 of knowing as well as the reality they know, to endeavour to understand 

 how our versions of experience are, or may be, affected by our mental 

 procedures, and, if we do conclude that research, supplemented by thought, 

 delivers reality into our hands, to justify our conclusion. 



