PLACE OF INSTINCTS IN OUR SOCIAL LIFE 653 



or respect. In other words, the fact that we hate an individual means 

 that in certain circumstances we shall be liable to experience a certain 

 emotion towards him ; if he succeeds where we have failed, we are jealous 

 of him. Now it is evident that we can have an almost indefinite variety 

 of shades in which the primary emotions may be compounded. A simple 

 example is the emotion of admiration. It is not merely an expression of 

 wonder ; because we are conscious of a temptation to shrink from approach- 

 ing the admired object, and in a case of simple wonder, we do not have 

 that feeling. This other element must surely be the emotion of subjection, 

 which we experience in the presence of what we feel are superior powers. 

 It should be remarked that our admiration may be excited by a person for 

 whom we have not yet developed an organised sentiment ; and the same 

 occurs in the case of the complex emotions of reverence, contempt, and 

 loathing. For the remainder of the complex emotions we mentioned — 

 reproach, anxiety, shame, or revenge — there is required a developed sentiment 

 before we can experience them. Reproach, for example, appears to be 

 compounded of anger and tender emotion. The object of our reproach is 

 a person whom we love ; and it is that fact that explains why we feel reproach 

 towards an action of the loved person, when towards a person to whom we 

 were merely indifferent we should experience simple anger. These are but 

 two examples of the complex emotions that we may have, but they are 

 sufficient to suggest the lines along which the evolution of our emotional 

 life has proceeded. 



We have already referred to the working of intelligence on the free play 

 of instincts. It is clear that society would not have reached the complexity 

 and diversity it shows at present if the primary impulses of man had been 

 allowed free play. Man, indeed, has had to learn how to live in society, 

 and the process of learning has been long and slow, and has very often 

 ended, as a matter of fact, in the decay of successive societies. In the 

 primitive tribe or clan, the social discipline which the individual had to 

 submit to was of a comparatively simple and rigid type. The prime neces- 

 sity was safety from attack by other tribes, for the sufficient reason of 

 obtaining an adequate food-supply. It was to be expected, therefore, that 

 in such a society the discipline was based on fear — fear of the leader who 

 acted for the whole tribe in enforcing the restraints imposed on individual 

 freedom. The great force of the emotion of fear was bound to make that 

 discipline react with great efficacy on the conduct of the whole tribe ; and 

 it is found to-day among primitive peoples that the strength of the tribe 

 as a defensive or aggressive organisation is an indication of the rigidity 

 and also of the enlightenment of the social restraints upon individual conduct.^ 

 In modern society there is undoubtedly in practice a large measure of reliance 

 upon fear for the enforcing of moral rules ; but also there is a growing ten- 

 dency to substitute some reason or motive of a less harsh and primitive 

 nature. It is realised that, in many cases, threat of punishment, either 

 human or Divine, is at once unreliable and too severe. There can be little 

 doubt that this change is largely due to the extension of the sympathy that 

 is engendered by the tender emotion. In addition, it represents a further 

 stage in the subjection of instinct to intelligence. 



At this stage we are confronted with what we may call the dilemma of 

 civilisation. We have noticed that the more aggressive tribes among 

 primitive peoples do actually show higher morality than the more pacific 

 ones. We can illustrate this truth from another point of view — the history 

 of a single civilisation that has gone through all the stages from birth to 

 decay. Babylon, Greece, Rome, Spain — all give evidence pointing to the 

 same conclusion. In each case the rise to eminence took place along with 



* See Wm. M'Dougall's Intvoduction to Social Psychology, chapter xi. 



