286 PROCEEDINGS OP THE AMERICAN ACADEMY 



his observation to the premises, in his discussion of philosophical 

 and practical questions. On the contrary, he seemed to be indif- 

 ferent to the appearance and reputation of originality, and actuated 

 by a singleness of purpose and a loyalty to the views of his teachers in 

 philosophy and science which were inconsistent with motives of per- 

 sonal vanity. The exercise of his admirably trained dialectical powers 

 doubtless afforded him intrinsic delight, the joy of play, or of sponta- 

 neity of power ; but it was none the less always subordinated to moral 

 purposes which were clearly defined in his youth, and loyally pursued 

 throughout an active intellectual life for nearly half a century. But 

 his broad practical aims were never allowed, on the other hand, to 

 pervert the integrity and honesty of his intellect. Though an advo- 

 cate all his life, urging reasons for unpopular measures of reform, and 

 defences of an unpopular philosophy or criticisms of the prevailing one, 

 he was not led, as advocates too frequently are, to the indiscriminate 

 invention and use of bad and good arguments. He weighed his argu- 

 ments as dispassionately as if his aim had been pure science. Rarely 

 have strength of emotion and purpose and strength of intellect been 

 combined in a thinker with such balance and harmony. The strength 

 of his moral emotions gave him insights or premises which had been 

 overlooked by the previous thinkers whose views he expounded or 

 defended. Tliis advantage over his predecessors was conspicuous ui 

 the form he gave to the utilitarian tlieory of moral principles, and in 

 what was strictly original in his " Principles of Political Economy." 



In the latter, the two chief points of originality were, first, his treat- 

 ment of the subject as a matter of pure abstract science, like geometry ; 

 or as an account of the means which are requisite to attain given ends 

 in economics, or the cost needed to procure a given value, without 

 bringing into the discussion the irrelevant practical questions, whether 

 this cost should be incurred, or whether the end were on the whole 

 desirable. These questions really belong to other branches of practical 

 philosophy, — to the sciences of legislation, politics, and morals, to which 

 the principles of political economy stand in the relation of an abstract 

 science to sciences of applied principles and concrete matters. But, 

 secondly, while thus limiting the province of this science, he introduced 

 into it premises from the moi-al nature of man, by the omission of which 

 previous writers had been led to conclusions in the science of a char- 

 acter gloomy and forbidding. The theory of population of Mai thus, as 

 elaborated by Ricardo, seemed to subject the human race to a hopeless 

 necessity of poverty in the masses. Whether the principle of popula- 

 tion did really necessitate this conclusion would depend, Mill taught, 



