288 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY 



practical conclusions and applications of the science ; seeing that hope 

 can subsist with the desire that inspires it, provided the desire is instru- 

 mental in effecting what is hoped for. It was because he believed in 

 " moral causation " that he treated political science, in general, in the 

 manner and by the methods of physical philosophy, or as a science of 

 causes and effects. He believed that he himself and his generation 

 would effect much for the future of mankind. His faith was that we 

 live in times in which broad principles of justice, persistently pro- 

 claimed, end in carrying the world with thera. 



Plis hopefulness, generosity, and courage, and a chivalric, almost 

 romantic disposition in him, seemed to those least acquainted with him 

 inconsistent with the utilitarian philosophy of morals, which he not 

 only professed, but earnestly and even zealously maintained. The 

 " greatest happiness principle " was with him a religious principle, to 

 which every impulse in his nature, high or low, was subordinated. 

 It was for him uot only a test of rational rules of conduct (which is 

 all that could bt, or was, claimed for it in his philosophy of morals), 

 but it became for him a leading motive and sanction of conduct in his 

 theory of life. That other minds differently constituted would be 

 most effectively influenced to the nobility of right conduct by other 

 sanctions and motives, to which the utilitarian principle ought to be 

 regarded as only a remote philosophical test or rational standard, was 

 what he believed and taiight. Unlike Bentham, his master in practical 

 philosophy, he felt no contempt for the claims of sentiment, and made 

 no intolerant demand for toleration. He sincerely v/elcomed intelligent 

 and earnest opposition with a deference due to truth itself, and to a 

 just regard for the diversities in men's minds from differences of edu- 

 cation and natural dispositions. These diversities even appeared to him 

 essential to the completeness of the examination which the evidences of 

 truth demand. Opinions positively erroneous, if intelligent and honest, 

 are not without their value, since the progress of truth is a succession 

 of mistakes and corrections. Truth itself, unassailed by erroneous 

 opinion, would soon degenerate into narrowness and error. The errors 

 incident to individuality of mind and character are means, in the attri- 

 tion of discussion, of keeping the truth bright and untarnished, and 

 even of bringing its purity to light. The human mind cannot afford 

 to forget its past aberrations. These, as well as its true discoveries, 

 are indispensable guides ; nor can it ever afford to begin from the start- 

 ing-point in its search for truth, in accordance with the too confident 

 method of more ambitious philosophers. 



Such being his loyalty and generosity, it is not surprising that IMill 



