1894. INSTINCT IN CHICKS AND DUCKLINGS. 213 



against their inclination. Lastl}', there is the shrill cry of distress 

 when, for example, one of them is separated from the rest. I have 

 \ery little doubt that all of these sounds have, or soon acquire, a 

 suggestive value of emotional import for the other chicks. Certainly 

 the danger note at once places others on the alert. But the suggestive 

 value seems to be the result of association and the product of 

 experience. 



The foregoing observations I have presented much in the form, 

 though with many omissions, in which they were noted down at the 

 time ; hence much crudity of expression. They appear to me to 

 suggest — 



(i.) That there are many truly inherited activities performed 

 with considerable but not perfect exactitude in virtue of an innate 

 automatism of structure. 



(2.) That associations are formed rapidly and have a considerable 

 amount of permanence. 



(3.) That intelligent utilisation of experience is founded on the 

 associations so formed ; such associations being a matter of indi- 

 vidual acquisition, and not of inheritance. 



(4.) That there is no evidence of instinctive knowledge, even in a 

 loose acceptation of this word. This follows from the non-inheritance 

 of associations of impressions and ideas. Co-ordination of. activities is 

 thus apparently inherited, but not correlation of impressions and ideas. 



(5.) That even the inherited co-ordinations are perfected and 

 rendered more effective by intelligent guidance. 



(6.) That imitation is an important factor in the early stages of 

 mental development. 



(7.) That the inherited activities on their first performance are 

 not guided by consciousness, though they are probably accompanied 

 by consciousness. The role of consciousness is that of control and 

 guidance. Only on the first performance of an inherited activity is 

 the chick a conscious automaton. In so far as the activity is subse- 

 quently modified and perfected by intelligence the agent exercises 

 conscious control. If we then term it an automaton, we must admit 

 that the automaton has a power of control over its actions in 

 accordance with the conscious concomitants of certain cerebral 

 changes. Into the physiological mechanism of control, as I conceive 

 it, I cannot enter here. 



C. Lloyd Morgan, 



