IV. 



Some Current Problems in Experimental 



Psychology. 



RECENT notes in Natural Science and in Nature seem to indicate 

 that England is at last awaking to the fact that experimental 

 psychology — which is an endowed science over practically the whole 

 continent of Europe, and throughout the United States of America — 

 has some claims upon her attention. It may not be amiss, at the 

 present juncture, to put together a rough list of the problems most 

 prominently upon the carpet ; more especially as the statement of them 

 may serve to dispel certain wrong ideas, as to the scope and subject- 

 matter of the new discipline, which are unhappily prevalent in extra- 

 psychological circles. 



But first, as to definitions. Psychophysics is the science of the 

 relation of " mind " to " body." Experimental Psychologv is just psycho- 

 logy ; the science which describes " mental " processes, and enumerates 

 their conditions. The experimental method is not intended to oust 

 introspection ; accurately controlled introspection is experiment, and 

 experiment is introspection made scientifically valuable, i.e., universally 

 valid. Physiological Psychology is an experimental psychology pursued 

 by physiological methods, and with constant reference to the " physical 

 substrate of mind." It is, therefore, narrower than experimental 

 psychology proper, in that its methods are more restricted : it is 

 wider than experimental psychology, in that it admits of the psycho- 

 physical reference, which does not obtain in psychology as such. 



It is often said, whether by way of reproach or merely as fact, 

 that experimental psychology is primarily or exclusively the 

 psychology of sensation. But the truth or falsehood of such a 

 statement depends altogether on the definition of sensation, 

 (i) Some psychologists (like Miinsterberg) regard "sensation" as 

 the one ultimate constituent of mind. For them, " psychology " is, of 

 course, equivalent to " doctrine of sensation." Only their use of the 

 term must not be confused with the usage of physiology and of 

 opposed schools of psychology. (2) Others (like Kulpe) posit a two- 

 fold basis of mind: sensation and affection ( = pleasure - pain). 

 (3) Others, again (like Sully), make every psychosis triple ; its three 



