SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 175 



as different forms of one and the same "substance" and with his principle, 

 derived therefrom, of the validity of the laws of human reason even in nature. 

 When afterwards, in Leipzig, Schelling became acquainted with natural sci- 

 ence, chiefly with chemistry, which was then making great strides, there 

 awakened in him a desire to create, like Spinoza, one common system of 

 thought embracing the whole of existence, which was to prove the connexion 

 between the worlds of nature and of the spirit, in that the world of nature 

 would be derived from that of the spirit, and, vice versa, the world of the 

 spirit from that of nature. The latter became the aim of Schelling's natural 

 philosophy proper, which in one place he terms " Spinozismus der Physik." 



Schelling s natural philosophy 

 From this a new natural science was to arise, which was not only to observe 

 individual phenomena and from them derive certain universal principles, but 

 which would actually understand the fundamental forces that cause all that 

 happens in nature. Thus it was a program of natural research directly opposed 

 to that developed theoretically by Bacon and practically by Galileo, which, 

 indeed, research has followed since then. Nevertheless, Schelling expresses 

 the deepest contempt for this natural research; in one place he calls Bacon, 

 Newton, and Boyle the bane of natural science, and Lavoisier's chemistry 

 is treated with no less disdain. It is natural enough that the so-called Spinoz- 

 ism which Schelling would put in its place should become a mere dogmatic 

 system of thought; moreover, as he was entirely lacking in patience and 

 consistency in matters of detail, his theory became vague and fragmentary. 

 In view of the great influence it exercised on the development of biology, 

 however, an attempt must be made to describe it. 



In a paper entitled Darstellung ineines Systems, which Schelling, after the 

 manner of Spinoza, wrote in the form of a series of statements and proofs — 

 though unfortunately entirely without that strictly binding logic which 

 characterizes every sentence of the great Jewish thinker — he describes first 

 of all the ' ' absolute reason " as " eine tot ale Indifferent, des Subjektiven und 

 Objektiven," which is to be attained by thinking of reason while being fully 

 abstracted from one's thinking self. This is indeed ultimately the same as 

 the mystical view with which Spinoza concludes and with which Schelling 

 thus, strikingly enough, begins. Outside this reason there is nothing, and 

 in it is everything. The supreme law governing the existence of reason is 

 the law of identity — that is, A = A. "Die absolute Identitat kann nicht un- 

 endlich sich selbst erkennen, ohne sich als Subjekt und Objekt unendlich xu setzen. 

 Dieser Satz. ist durch sich selbst klar." Thus arises the contrast between subject 

 and object, by which Kant, as we know, meant the consciousness that con- 

 ceives and the thing which is conceived, and which in Schelling means about 

 the same. Further on, the absolute identity is said to correspond to the uni- 

 verse, whereupon the subject and object are denoted by A = B; finally 



