MODERN BIOLOGY 445 



Comte, indeed, maintains with the latter that the species are invariable, "for 

 the idea of species would inevitably cease to represent an exact scientific 

 definition if we were to allow an unlimited modification of different species, 

 the one in the other." This opposition of Comte's to the theory of the origin 

 of species was undoubtedly the cause of Haeckel's refusing to acknowledge 

 him as a precursor in respect of monism, which he nevertheless was far more 

 than any of those whom Haeckel enumerates. 



The details of Comte's biological speculations are, of course, of interest 

 only from the point of view of curiosity. He associates himself with Blain- 

 ville's animal system, with its exclusive reference to external characteristics; 

 he himself lays down three main types for the entire animal kingdom: 

 Osteozoa, Entomozoa, and Malacozoa — that is, Vertebrata, Articulata, 

 and Mollusca — a classification the clumsiness of which scarcely needs 

 pointing out; indeed, the Mollusca group in particular, a reversion to Lin- 

 naeus's Vermes, was at the time utterly absurd. Still worse, however, is 

 Comte's attempt to analyse "the intellectual and moral cerebral functions," 

 for here he becomes infatuated with Gall's phrenology. It is only natural 

 from his point of view that he should reject Descartes's theory of the parallel 

 existence of the soul and the body, and the other "metaphysicians" likewise 

 offer many points of attack. In his criticism of the earlier psychology, then, 

 Comte has shown very keen observation, but the psychology that he him- 

 self created is all the more lacking in criticism. He denies the possibility of 

 psychical self-observation, for one cannot divide oneself into two parts for 

 the one part to observe the other, and besides one cannot in this way find out 

 the mental life of the animals, which is the vital preliminary stage to that 

 of man. True psychology should, according to Comte, be based on Gall's 

 theory of intellectual and moral areas in the brain, which is the beginning of 

 an entirely new psychology. Here modern psycho-physical research has pro- 

 ceeded along a line which Comte never dreamt of and which led to the 

 complete acceptance of that idea of "self-observation" which he despised. 



His sociology 

 The last three sections of Comte's work deal with sociology, the doctrine 

 of social statics (that is, organization), and dynamics (that is, progress). 

 Eventually these problems entirely usurped the place of natural science in his 

 life's work. It is true that he produced ideas of value in this sphere too: the 

 actual principle of studying social life from, so to speak, a biological point 

 of view has indeed won adherents in modern times, and a number of items 

 in his program, as, for instance, mixed schools, have actually been adopted. 

 But on the whole his social theory is only a curiosity. This is due mostly to 

 the strange development that he himself underwent. While still a young 

 man he had for a year been a lunatic, but he afterwards recovered his mental 

 balance. When he had concluded his great book, he added to it a general 



