458 MARGARET F. WASHBURN 



ment. There are two main lines of psychic evolution: in verte- 

 brates we have the evolution of intelligence at the sacrifice of 

 instinct, and in invertebrates the evolution of instinct at the 

 expense of intelligence. The fundamental difference between 

 instinct and intelligence is a metaphysical rather than an out- 

 wardly observable one. Intelligence is the power of using cate- 

 gories, knowledge of the relations of things. The knowledge 

 w^hich it gives is not direct; to be intelligible is to be explicable 

 in terms of something else. Instinct is inward looking, intuition ; 

 it gives direct knowledge, although knowledge limited in scope. 

 Intelligence uses detachable tools: the tools of instinct are 

 organic. 



Stout's '* contribution to the discussion considers three prob- 

 lems that have been raised by the preceding papers, (i) Is it 

 true, as Morgan holds in opposition to M^^ers, that instinctive 

 behavior cannot at the outset be determined by intelligent 

 consciousness, since intelligence is learning by experience, and 

 at the outset there is no experience? Stout's answer to this 

 question has his characteristic subtlety. An animal performs 

 an action the first time from pure instinct. The second time, its 

 behavior is modified by what it has learned from experience. 

 But when did it do the learning? Sureh' at the time of the first 

 performance of the action, which then, if learning be the char- 

 acteristic of intelligence, was intelligent as well as instinctive. 

 Looking at the matter from another point of view, if we say that 

 at the second performance of the action the animal anticipates 

 the sensations and feelings that accompanied its first performance, 

 we cannot explain this anticipation by saying that the sensations 

 and feelings are revived by association, unless there was an ele- 

 ment of anticipation in the sensations and feelings at their first 

 occurrence. "If a past process contains no reference to the 

 future, the mere revival of it will not contain any such reference." 

 " I see no intrinsic absurdity in the assumption that even in 

 the commencement of the first performance of an instinctive 

 action, the given situation may be apprehended as about to have 

 a further development." 



(2) The Bergsonian position that instinct is a peculiar form 

 of knowing distinct from intelligence, is opposed by Stout. 

 " I find nothing in the instinctive behavior of animals which 

 cannot be accounted for by the combination of certain purely 



