contacts with fundamentals, wherein he looks 

 upon mental initiative as non-existent; the animal 

 being merely an automatic organism whose re- 

 flexes are conditioned solely by external factors — 

 and here he leans farther backward in his reason- 

 ing, so to speak, than he was previously inclined 

 toward the anthropomorphic view: the third, in 

 which still further experience fails to confirm his 

 convictions, and in which he eventually is obliged 

 to reckon with the fact that animals of the same 

 species, among other mental endowments, are pos- 

 sessed even with a temperament; differing among 

 themselves in this as they differ physically — just 

 as humans do. And he finally concludes that 

 although the mind of man has superior qualities, 

 that of the lower vertebrate is essentially the 

 same ; which is to say that he knows as little about 

 the matter as he knew at the beginning, excepting, 

 perhaps, that he realizes the paradox that his ac- 

 quired ignorance is owing to a fuller knowledge. 

 Yet, even though experience were wanting, 

 reflection alone should oblige us to believe that 

 the "brute" is not so "dumb" as it may seem. I 

 think we can agree, without violence to our ego- 

 centric notions, that there is much in common be- 



[196] 



