536 PROTOPLASM 



the mechanist — the physicochemical biologist — does not do this, 

 if he is a good experimenter, any more than a good clockmaker 

 ignores the coordination of all the parts that make up a clock. 

 In stating that a whole is greater than the sum of its parts, 

 we do not thereby endow the system with a property apart from 

 this world. 



A philosophy wherein living matter is interpreted as an organ- 

 ized functional system is not only an escape from a too rigid 

 acceptance of either the mechanistic or vitalistic concepts, but 

 it is also an escape from the fatalistic attitude of those who 

 bemoan the harsh severity of experimental science. There has 

 been of late a very evident drift away from the philosophy of 

 Helmholtz, who declared that "the final aim of all natural science 

 is to resolve itself into mechanics." 



The reaction to mechanism set in early — if indeed it has not 

 always existed — thus, William Keith Brooks objected to the 

 thoughts of his mind being regarded simply as the "rattle 

 of machinery." Kepner has more recently stated that the 

 one-celled animal Amoeba meets contingencies (see page 58) : 

 "This fact carries us beyond science, whether we like it or not." 

 Jennings says, "Emergent evolution does away with that mon- 

 strous absurdity that has so long been a reproach to biological 

 science — the doctrine that ideas, ideals, purposes have no effect 

 on behavior." The pragmatism of James — which sees in evo- 

 lution the development of intellect, reason, emotion, and will, 

 purely from the viewpoint of a relation to nervous systems, 

 sense organs, and general complexity of structure — has been 

 severely criticized on the ground that it will lead to the debasing 

 concept that ideals, and truth itself, are merely an adaptation 

 to a useful purpose. Pragmatism claims that everything must 

 find its place in a general scheme of usefulness. In a sense, 

 this is all true and perhaps to be desired, but that the experi- 

 mental method, a mechanistic interpretation of vital processes, 

 and the philosophy of functional organization lead to a system 

 of ethics "more characteristic of a savage than a civilized state" 

 is nonsensical. If science has failed to make its additions to 

 the betterment of mankind in the same way as have the human- 

 ities, then it is not the experimental or mechanistic method 

 that is responsible, nor, indeed, is it science in any form, but 

 rather man's application of the truths unearthed through science. 



