Aristotle • On Plants 91 



Empedocles supposes that the two difficult to find a condition intermedi- 

 classes (plants and animals) were ate between the presence of life and 

 mixed in plants. Similarly Plato averred the absence of it. One might argue that 

 that plants must know desire, because since the plant is a living thing, we are 

 of the extreme demands of their nutri- at once entitled to call it a living crea- 

 tive capacity. If this were established, ture. But this is not so. For it is diffi- 

 it would be in accord with it that they cult to assign the constitution of a 

 should really know pleasure and pain, plant to the constitution of the soul of 

 and that they should feel. And once an animal. Men's reason for denying 

 this is established, it will be in accord life to plants is that they do not feel, 

 with it that plants should know desire. For there are some animals that lack 

 if they ever have sleep and are aroused cognition. Now we know that shell- 

 by wakening. Similarly again, if we fish are living creatures, but lack cogni- 

 inquire whether they breathe, and tion [sic], because they are both plants 

 whether they are born by a union of and animals at the same time. Again 

 the sexes or otherwise we shall have there are animals which possess no fe- 

 considerable doubt on the question, male sex, others again which do not 

 and shall have to prosecute a long beget, and others which have no power 

 search. oi movement, others, again, which dif- 

 We have quoted the belief (of fer in colour, and others still which 

 Plato) that if anything receives food, it have an offspring unlike themselves, 

 also desires and has pleasure in satiety, and others still are born from earth 

 and suffers pain when it is hungry, or trees. What then is the principle 

 Plato's theory is marvelous, though its of the soul in the living creature? 

 errors are not slight, I mean the theory What else but what makes the noble 

 in which he supposed that plants could animal, which goes through the 

 feel and desire. We maintain that heavens, the sun, the stars and the 

 plants know neither desire nor sensa- planets, which are raised above the 

 tion. Now in plants we find no sensa- perplexities involved and are not lia- 

 tion, nor any organ which can feel, nor ble to be affected? For sensation is 

 anything in the least like it, nor any an affectation of those who can feel, 

 differentiated form, nor any method of But one must recognize that plants 

 approach to sense apprehension, nor have no movement of themselves, for 

 any sign by which we could judge that they are fixed in the earth and the 

 plants have sensation, corresponding earth does not move. But life itself is 

 to the signs by which we know that really an intermediate state; for the 

 they are nourished and grow. Even this soulless has no soul, nor any parts of the 

 is not established among us except be- soul. But the plant does not belong to 

 cause we are aware that the nutritive the class which has no soul, because 

 and growing faculties are parts of the there is some part of the soul in it, but 

 soul. Whenever, then, we find that a the plant is not a living creature, be- 

 plant of this kind has within it some cause there is no feeling in it. But even 

 part of the soul, we necessarily know if it has a soul, we do not admit that it 

 that it also has a soul, but when it is has any feeling. Anything that is nour- 

 lacking in sensation, then we have no ished cannot be without a soul. Ever)' 

 right to maintain that it is a thing of living creature has a soul. But the plant 

 sense, for sensation is responsible for is an incomplete thing. The absorption 

 the illumination of life. of food is part of the principle of the 

 These differences of opinion are plant's nature, and thus is a character- 

 produced at this point because it is istic common to animal and plant. But 



