Shehlnji— The Literature of Ethical Science. 113 



satisfied with any other man's statement of it. He may wish 

 to point out how he is " Determinist " in one aspect of the 

 question and " Indeterminist " in another aspect of it. He 

 will be anxious to qualify himself in a multitude of ways with 

 the hope that he can throw some new light on this dark realm 

 of metaphysical speculation. At times we may lay down one 

 of these treatises with the feeling as if the writer had upheld 

 both standpoints and — " you take your choice." 



The fact of it is that the very terms " freedom of the will," 

 "determinism," and " indeterminism " should be dropped 

 from the vocabulary of ethics. If this could be done, one or 

 more chapters might easily be dispensed with in many of these 

 treatises. They are terms which arose in connection with a 

 special period in the history of ethical theory, and are 

 painfully interwoven with the other great department of 

 theology. The retention of old terms which have become 

 like worn coins, is sometimes a positive affliction to the ad- 

 vance of clear thinking. The old Greek was a happy man to 

 have lived before the words " freedom of the will," and 

 " determinism " had been coined or introduced into phi- 

 losophy. 



On the whole, perhaps the finest analysis of the problem is 

 to be found in the treatises on ethics by Wundt and Green. 

 But in passing I may give you a certain interesting compromise 

 solution from Paulsen: " Freiheit des Menschen ist Herr- 

 schaft der Vernunft, Knechtschaft des Menschen ist Herr- 

 schaft der animalischen Begierden." 



At the same time it must be taken into consideration that 

 in such a condensed statement, little of what I have been 

 saying on this special problem can have definite significance 

 apart from the chapters where the problem is discussed. 

 Had doctrinal theology never got mixed in here, it may be 

 that this would never have been a department for the treatises 

 on ethical science. 



V. It will also be evident enough that when it comes to 

 the subject of the relation between ethics and religion, we 

 shall enter a domain of sentiment or feeling; where we shall 

 not have very clear sailing. But in this direction there has 



