386 ZOOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY 



emotion of the inner feeling which leads it to produce some act of 

 intelligence or several such acts in succession. 



As in every other bodily activity, thought is achieved only by an 

 excitation of the inner feeling, so that, except for organic movements 

 essential to the preservation of life, acts of intelUgence and those of 

 the muscular system are always excited by the individual's inner 

 feeUng and should really be regarded as the product of that feeUng. 



Seeing that thought is an action, it follows that it can only be carried 

 out when the inner feeling excites the nervous fluid of the hypocephalon 

 to produce it, and that, considering the passive condition of the cerebral 

 pulp, the fluid in question must be the only active body that takes a 

 share in this action. 



Since a being, endowed with an organ of intelligence, has the 

 faculty of setting its nervous fluid in motion, and of guiding that fluid 

 over the impressed outlines of some previously acquired idea, such a 

 being immediately becomes conscious of this idea when the action is 

 excited. Now this act is a thought, although a very simple one, and 

 it is at the same time an act of memory. But if, instead of recalling 

 a single idea, the individual recalls several, and carries out operations 

 on these ideas, he then forms thoughts less simple and more prolonged, 

 and he can thus carry out various intellectual acts and indeed a long 

 succession of such acts. 



Thought is therefore an action, which may be complicated by a great 

 many others of the same kind carried out successively or sometimes 

 almost simultaneously ; it may also embrace a large number of ideas 

 of all kinds. 



Not only do the operations of thought include ideas already in 

 existence or traced in the organ, but they may also produce ideas 

 which did not previously exist. The results of comparisons, the rela- 

 tions ascertained between different ideas, and, lastly, the products of 

 the imagination, are so many new ideas for the individual ; they are 

 generated by his thought, impressed on his organ, and subsequently 

 transferred to his inner feeling. 



Judgments, for example, which are also called inferences, because 

 they result from comparisons or calculations, consist both of thoughts 

 and of acts subsequent to thoughts. 



The same thing holds good with regard to arguments, for we know 

 that several judgments drawn in turn from compared ideas constitute 

 what we call an argument ; now arguments, being only series of in- 

 ferences, likewise consist of thoughts and of acts subsequent to 

 thoughts. 



It follows from all this that no creature which is destitute of ideas 

 could carry out any thought or judgment, and still less any argument. 



