372 ZOOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY 



Not only do ideas originate in two different ways, but a distinction 

 has also to be drawn between those which only become perceptible 

 to us in company with the sensation which produced them, and those 

 which are presented to our consciousness without any accompanying 

 sensation. 



Theformer I call physico-moral ideas, and thelsittev moral ideas simply. 



Physico-moral ideas are clear, vivid, and sharply defined, and are 

 felt with all the force that they derive from their accompanying 

 sensation. Thus the sight of a building or any other object under my 

 eyes to which I pay attention, gives rise in me to one or several ideas 

 by which I am vividly affected. 



Moral ideas, on the other hand, both simple and complex, of which 

 we only become conscious as the result of an operation of our under- 

 standing excited by our inner feeling, are very vague and ill-defined 

 and do not affect us with any vividness, although we are sometimes 

 stirred by them. Thus, when I recall an object that I have seen and 

 noticed, a judgment that I have formed, a reasoning which I have 

 carried out, etc., the idea only affects me in a weak and vague manner. 



We must then beware of confusing what we experience when we 

 have the consciousness of some idea, from what we experience when 

 a sensation affects us and we pay attention to it. 



All that we are conscious of only comes to us through the organ of 

 intelUgence, and whatever causes sensation in us works firstly through 

 the sensitive organ and afterwards through the idea that we form of 

 it, if we happen to pay attention to it. 



It is essential, therefore, to distinguish moral from physical feehng, 

 since experience of the past teaches us that a failure to recognise that 

 distinction has led men of the highest abihty to draw up theories 

 which now have to be destroyed. 



No doubt both feehngs are physical, but the difference in the terms 

 that I use to distinguish them is sufficient for the purpose that I have 

 in view, and moreover they are the terms in common use. 



By moral feeling I mean the feeling that we experience when an 

 idea or thought or any act of our understanding is transmitted to our 

 inner feehng, so that we then have consciousness of it. 



By physical feeling I mean the feeling which we experience from some 

 sensation due to an impression on any of our senses and compeUing 

 our attention. 



These clear and simple definitions must show that the two things are 

 quite different from one another, both as regards their origin and 

 their effects. 



It is however through confusing them, as Condillac had done, that 

 M. de Tracy has said : 



