OF THE UNDERSTANDING 373 



" Thinking is only feeling, and feeling is for us the same thing as 

 existing ; since it is sensations that tell us of our existence. Ideas 

 or perceptions are either true sensations or recollections, or affinities 

 that we perceive, or indeed the desire that may be raised in us by these 

 affinities : the faculty of thought is thus sub-divided into true sensi- 

 biUty, memory, judgment, and will." 



In all this there is clearly a confusion between sensations and the 

 consciousness of our ideas, thoughts, judgments, etc. It is a similar 

 confusion between moral feeling and physical feeling that has led to the 

 behef that every creature, which possesses the faculty of feehng, also 

 has that of intelligence ; for this is certainly ill-founded. 



Sensations no doubt tell us of our existence, but only when we pay 

 attention to them. That is to say, we have to think of them, and this 

 is an act of intelligence. 



Thus, in the case of man and the most perfect animals, sensations 

 that are noticed acquaint them with existence and give ideas ; but in 

 the case of the more imperfect animals, such for instance, as the insects, 

 in which I recognise no organ for intelligence, sensations cannot be 

 remarked, nor yield ideas ; and they can only form simple perceptions 

 of the objects which affect the individual. 



Yet the insect possesses an inner feehng capable of emotions which 

 make it act ; but since there is no idea connected with it, it cannot be 

 conscious of its existence ; in short, it never experiences any moral 

 feeling. 



In the case of all creatures endowed with intelhgence, we must 

 therefore say : to think is to feel morally, or to have consciousness 

 of one's ideas and thoughts, and also of one's existence ; but this is 

 not the same as physical feehng, for the latter is a product of the 

 system of sensations while the former comes from the organic system 

 of intelhgence. 



Simple Ideas. 



A simple idea, arising from a sensation of some object affecting one 

 of our senses, can only be formed when the sensation is remarked, 

 and when the result of the sensation is transmitted to the organ of 

 intelhgence and traced or graven on some part of it ; this result is 

 perceived by the individual because at the same moment it affects his 

 inner feehng. 



Indeed every individual which possesses the faculty of feehng and 

 also an organ for intelhgence, promptly receives in this organ the image 

 or outhnes brought by the sensation of any object, if the organ is 

 prepared for it by attention. Now these outhnes or image of the 

 object reach the hypocephalon by means of a second reaction of the 



