THE PRINCIPAL ACTS 401 



subject to different degrees of correctness, and that this correctness 

 is relative to the individual's circumstances, naturally lead me to say 

 a word about reason, to enquire what it is, and to compare it with 

 instinct. 



OF REASON. 



And its Comparison with Instinct. 



Reason is not a faculty ; still less is it a torch or entity of any kind ; 

 but it is a special condition of the individual's intellectual faculties ; 

 a condition that is altered by experience, gradually improves and con- 

 trols the judgments, according as the individual exercises his intellect. 



Reason therefore is a quality that may be possessed in different 

 degrees, and this quality can only be recognised in a being that 

 possesses certain intellectual faculties. 



In the last analysis, it may be said that for all individuals endowed 

 with intelligence, reason is nothing more than a stage acquired in the 

 rectitude of judgments. 



No sooner are we born than we experience sensations, mainly from 

 external objects affecting our senses ; we quickly acquire ideas, which 

 are formed in us as a result of noticed sensations ; and we soon com- 

 pare almost mechanically the objects we have noticed and thus form 

 judgments. 



But we are then new to the whole of our environment, destitute of 

 experience, and deceived by some of our senses, so that we judge badly ; 

 we are mistaken as to the distances, shapes, colours, and consistency 

 of the objects that we notice, and we do not grasp the relations existing 

 between them. It is necessary that several of our senses should 

 combine gradually to destroy our errors and rectify our judgments ; 

 lastly, it is only with the help of time, experience, and attention paid 

 to the objects which affect us, that rectitude is slowly attained in our 

 judgments. 



The same thing is true with regard to our complex ideas, and the 

 useful truths, rules, or precepts communicated to us. It is only by 

 means of much experience, and memory in collecting all the elements 

 for an inference ; only by means of the greatest use of our under- 

 standing, that our judgment on these matters is gradually improved. 



Hence the wide difference existing between the judgments of child- 

 hood and those of youth ; hence again the difference found between 

 the judgments of a young man of twenty and those of a man of forty 

 or more, when the intellect in both cases has always been regularly 

 exercised. 



Since the extent of our reason is proportional to the rectitude of our 



