THE PRINCIPAL ACTS 403 



and low development of the faculties in such an animal, just as it is in 

 man. In both cases the same features are to be recognised, and an 

 analogous progress in the acquirements ; it is only a matter of more 

 or less in the different species. 



In animals possessing a special organ for intelhgence, there are there- 

 fore various degrees in the rectitude of judgments and hence various 

 degrees of reason. 



Doubtless the highest degree of reason gives man a perception of 

 the propriety or impropriety both of his own ideas and beUefs, and of 

 the ideas and beUefs of others ; but this perception, which is a judgment, 

 is not a property of all men. Those who do not possess it substitute a 

 false perception in place of that just perception which arises from a 

 highly trained intellect ; and, since the former is the best they can 

 attain, they believe it to be just. Hence arises that diversity of 

 opinions and judgments in individuals of the human species ; a 

 diversity which will always stand in the way . of a real agreement 

 between the ideas and judgments of individuals, owing to the fact 

 that men are situated in very different circumstances and therefore 

 cannot attair the same degree of reason. 



If we now compare reason with instinct, we shall see that the 

 former to some extent gives rise to determinations to act, originating 

 in the intellect, that is to say, in ideas, thoughts, and judgments ; 

 whereas instinct, on the contrary, is a force which impels towards an 

 action, without any previous determination or intellectual act. 



Now, since reason is only a stage acquired in rectitude of judgments, 

 the determinations of action which spring from it may be wrong or 

 unsuitable when the judgments producing them are erroneous ; they 

 may be false in whole or in part. 



But instinct, which is simply an impelUng force and arises from the 

 inner feeUng when stirred by some need, never makes a mistake in 

 the action to be performed ; for it does not choose, nor does it result 

 from any judgment, and there are not really different degrees of it. 

 All action caused by instinct is therefore invariably due to the kind 

 of excitation produced by the individual's inner feeUng, just as all 

 movement communicated to a body is made up, both in direction and 

 strength, by the power which communicated it. 



There is nothing either clear or really exact in Cabanis' idea of 

 attributing reasoning to external sensations, and instinct to internal 

 impressions. All our impressions are invariably internal, although the 

 objects causing them may be either external or internal. Observation 

 of the facts should convince us that it is more just to say : 



That the reasonings and determinations, following from judgments, 

 take their origin from intellectual operations ; whereas instinct, in 



