ECONOMICS OF THE FISHERIES 327 



man assumes all and the dealer none of the risk in the transaction. The shore 

 dealer may also receive seasonal cash advance from the commission merchant 

 some of which he may in turn advance to fishermen. In this kind of business 

 the shore dealer can do business with little working capital and no risk to 

 speak of and renders little service to the fishermen. In some communities 

 there are too many dealers any one or a few of whom with little, if any, 

 increase in expense could handle the entire production. Multiplication of 

 dealers adds to the over-all cost. Here, as everywhere, it is easy to point out 

 the defects of the marketing mechanism, but difficult to show how they can 

 be overcome. 



If the shore dealer buys the fish outright from the fisherman, he makes the 

 price and takes all the risks of subsequent market prices, weather and spoil- 

 age, and where he must extend credit on his sales he must furnish the capital 

 and take the credit risks, too. He will of course minimize these risks as much 

 as possible, and so will his competitor, by offering the minimum price to the 

 fishermen. Somebody must furnish the working capital and take the consider- 

 able risks of both working and invested capital, as well as exert the selling 

 effort and do all the other work. If the fisherman is not prepared to do these 

 things himself, he must expect less than if he did. 



d. Fishermen' s Cooperatives. Many of the objections to the corporate 

 form of business apply to fishermen's cooperatives which are often mentioned 

 as a solution of the capital, management, and selling problems of fisheries 

 production. 



Few fishermen's cooperatives have been tried in this country. During the 

 NRA days of the 1930's cooperatives were established with Federal Govern- 

 ment sponsorship and finance at Rockland, Me., Edenton, Morehead City 

 and Southport, N. C, and Clearwater, Fla. All failed. In the Pacific North- 

 west, the Halibut Vessel Owners Association and the Halibut Fishermen's 

 Union jointly manufacture and sell vitamin oil from fish livers through a 

 cooperative management, but the fish are sold through the Seattle auction. 

 At Prince Rupert, B. C, a similar arrangement markets the fish (halibut, 

 salmon, etc.) as well as the livers and liver oil. In both these cases the fisheries 

 concerned are controlled by international commissions under treaty agree- 

 ments and the conditions appear to be more favorable to cooperative action 

 than those of other fisheries generally. 



Cooperatives rely on the capital of their members rather than that of 

 stockholders, and fishermen have no more savings capital for such purposes 

 collectively than they have individually. Since credit to some extent is neces- 

 sary to inland distributors, wholesalers and retailers, the cooperative must 

 exercise the judgment and control of credit, and take the risks involved, or 

 deal only through commission merchants for cash, and the latter are perhaps 

 the least satisfactory of all outlets for fish. 



