ECONOMICS OF THE FISHERIES 319 



exploitation that is often overlooked, namely, that as any one species of 

 fish is pursued and its abundance diminishes (as a result of fishing or any 

 other cause), the cost of producing it rises relative to the cost of catching 

 other species; if the price does not increase to compensate, the fishermen 

 discover the diminution of returns from this fishery and some of them take 

 up some other, so that part of the pressure is taken off the "over-fished" 

 species, a process which amounts to an automatic economic regulation of 

 the intensity and distribution of fishing. The principle applies also to the 

 fisheries collectively of a region operating in competition with other regions. 

 If the fisheries reach a point of diminishing returns in one region, economic 

 compulsion operates to relieve the pressure in favor of another. 



It appears to be impossible to exterminate a species or a fishery for 

 profit, since the profit disappears before the fish is exterminated. Within 

 the fisherman's freedom of choice to catch, and selectivity or non-selectivity 

 of gear, each species or fishery tends to be fished to a point at which it just 

 yields a wage to those engaged equal to what they could earn by fishing 

 other species, or by working at some other trade ashore. Equilibrium would 

 undoubtedly be established at this wage level for each species if natural 

 fluctuations did not occur in the supply of various species and if market 

 conditions remained constant. This operation of economic law is such as 

 to distribute the total fishing effort over the total fishery resources of a 

 region and to deliver a total of yield into the consuming market just sufficient 

 to meet total of demand. 



Some such law seems also to govern the total number of fishermen en- 

 gaged. Fishing as a gainful occupation is in competition with all oppor- 

 tunities on shore. Some men leave shore employment and go fishing in times 

 when they think opportunities are good and thus increase the competition 

 among fishermen, produce more fish, and depress the prices, as a reaction 

 to increased fishing. Theoretically, at least, the total number of fishermen 

 engaged is self -regulatory, and the distribution of those engaged spreads 

 itself out over all the opportunities of a region to satisfy the market with 

 all the available kinds of fish at a price which will move them against the 

 competition of fish from other regions and of other foods, such as meats 

 and poultry. The composition of the total catch is regulated by this complex 

 interrelationship of fluctuations in biological abundance and market demand 

 and the attempt of the fishing effort to adjust itself to these variations. 

 There are of course disequflibria due to the lag between the occurrence of 

 adversity or opportunity and the discovery of, and the response to, either 

 by fishermen. The tendency to saturate the opportunities also applies to 

 the investment of capital in the construction of fishing vessels. As many 

 vessels as can hope to operate at a profit are built, and for all the oppor- 

 tunities, and with as much versatility of purpose as possible, so that they. 



