1804. Jgrictiltural hitelUgence. j-^t 



* That the vdricus thanges in our corn la'ws are fo fur from ht'uia the 

 enlyt or even any confideraUe caufe of the decreafc of our exports of corn, 

 that there is no necefflty for f^ppoftng they have been any cavfe at all. ' 

 He then proceeds to fay (p. 331.), * After a long coufidcration of the 

 Corn accounts wliich were printed by order of Parliament in Novem- 

 ber 1 800, and weighing collateral circvimflanccs, it appears to me, 

 that the feafons, either good or bad, have been the efficient caiifes of 

 plenty or fcarcity, fron:i the epoch of the exportation bounty to the 

 prefenl times. After fully coufidering this interciling fubjeft, the fe- 

 ries of corn laws appeared to me like contiinicd attenipts to regulate the 

 feafons. ' He then obferves in regard to prices, * There are two poiat* 

 which are beyond the power of Parliament : the Legiflature cannot 

 regulate the courfe of the feafons ; neither can the Legiflature con- 

 troul the fubtle and filent depreciation of money, which fcems to have 

 the all powerful force of lleam. ' * 



This is found do6lrine. However (in p. 331.) Mr Chalmers ad- 

 vances the following f range pojillon. * I will now fpeak of the receot 

 dearths, which proceeded from various caufes. The principal caufe 

 was, undoubtedly, a long feries of unfavourable feafons. We have, as 

 I have already fliewn, not only a greater number of people to feed ; 

 but a greater number of opulent and wafteful people to feed, owing to 

 the favourable change in the circumftances of a great maiiy people. 

 In the mean time, the nvhole necr/Jaries of Ife were fold upon tL' prln- 

 c'lples of concert. From Cornwall to Caitrnfs^ there is an und.rfl. aiding 

 among the filers y ivho never forget that the confumers are wholly in their 

 power, /ind, by means of this underflandrng, and of that concerty there 

 is not a free tuarket in Britain^ ^svhtre the balance of fupply and demand 

 can vihrate 'without the interruptions of avarice.,^ &C. In pap-e 3331 

 after allowing of an enhancement of price from the war, in confidera- 

 tion of the more liberal fupply of the army and navy, and the confe- 

 quent additional demand, in proportion to the fupply, from the army- 

 agents, he thus proceeds : * But fome other effects of war contribute 

 to enhance the prices llill more. When the affefied taxes and the in- 

 come tax were collcfted, the fupphers oC the neceffaries of life con- 

 trived to impofe their proportion of thofe taxes on the confumers in the 

 pricesgof the neceflaiy articles, * &c. 



Now, we would pre fume to afk Mr Chalmers what becomes of hi'g 

 accuracy and moderation, when he afferts general conclulions of the 

 above nature, without the leaft fliadow of proof from facl, and upon 

 no better authority than his own ipfe dixit and private think. As his 

 opinion was however in bis opinion to have fuch unlimited credit with 

 the public, we muft give praife to his difcretion, in abllaining from 

 giving it during the time of dearth, that he might not increafe the 

 public irritation. We might alfo inquire upon what principle he jud-^os 

 of the effect of feafons, as that upon which prices depend more thau 

 upon corn laws. For if we admit of concert and combination among 

 the fellers as a principle regulating prices, it remains to be afcertained 



how 



* The author adopts implicitly Sir Gcoige Shuck burgli Evelyn's ratio of dcpiecia- 

 ti03, though we think the truth of its data very queftionable. 



