6 WILLIAM JAMES ON 



The ordinary theory, however, makes the matter much more complicated. The 

 idea of the end is supposed to awaken first i\. feeling of the proper motor innervation, 

 and this, when adjudged right, to discharge the muscular combination. 



Now what can be gained by the interposition of this second relay of feeling between 

 the idea and the movement ? Nothing on the score of economy of nerve tracts ; for it 

 takes just as many of them to associate a million ideas with a million motor feelings,^ 

 each specific, as to associate the same million ideas with a million insentient motor centres. 

 And nothing on the score of precision ; for the only conceivable way in which they might 

 further precision would be by giving to a mind whose notion of the end was vague, a sort 

 of halting stage with sharper imagery on which to collect its wits before uttering itajiat. 

 But not only are the conscious discriminations between " ends " much sharper than any 

 one pretends the shades of difference between feelings of innervation to be, but even 

 were this not the case, it is impossible to see how a mind with its end vaguely conceived, 

 could tell out of a lot of InnervatlonscjefiihU, were they never so sharply differentiated, 

 which one fitted that end exactly, and which did not. A sharply conceived end will on 

 the other hand directly awaken a distinct movement as easily as it will awaken a distinct 

 feelino- of innervation. If feelings can go astray through vagueness, surely the fewer 

 steps of feeling there are interposed, the more securely we shall act. We ought then on 

 a priori grounds alone to regard the Innervationsgefiihl as a pure encumbrance. 



Let us turn now to a j^osteriori evidence. 



It is a notorious fact, recognized by all writers^ on voluntary motion, that the will seems 

 concerned only with results and not with the muscular details by Avhich they are exe- 

 cuted. But when we say " results," what is it exactly that we mean ? We mean of 

 course, the movements objectively considered, and revealing themselves (as either accom- 

 plished or in process of being accomplished), to our sensible perceptions. Our idea, notion, 

 thought, of a movement, what we mean, whenever we sjieak of the movement, is this 

 sensible perception which we get of it when it is taking place, or has completely occurred. 



What then is this sensible perception ? 



What does it introspectively seem to be ? I unhesitatingly answer : an aggregate of 

 afferent feelings, coming primarily from the contraction of muscles, the stretching of ten- 

 dons, ligaments and skin, and the rubbing and pressing of joints; and secondarily, from 

 the eye, the ear, the skin, nose or palate, any or all of which may be indirectly aflected 

 by the movement as it takes place in another part of the body. The only idea of a 

 movement which we can possess is composed of images of these, its afferent effects. By 

 these diiFerences alone, are movements mentally distinguished from each other, and these 

 differences are sufficient for all the discriminations we can possibly need to make, when 

 we intend one movement rather than another. 



The recent writers who have been prompt to recognize the fact that volition is directed 

 only to results, have hardly been sensible of the far-reaching consequences of this admis- 

 sion, — consequences which will develop themselves as our inquiry proceeds. Meanwhile 



■• The associatioQ between the two orilers of feeling being ^ By no one more clearly set forth than by Hume himself 



of course brought about by a separate neural oonnexion in his essay on the Idea of Necessary Connection. The best 

 between the tracts supporting each. recent statement 1 know is by Jaccoud: Des Paraplegies et 



de TAtaxie du Mouvement. Paris, 1864. p. 591. 



