148 



Fishery Bulletin 90(l|, 1992 



Treaty of Waitangi between the Maoris and the British, 

 signed in 1840, deeds the Maoris' rights to their tradi- 

 tional fisheries.2 



Although New Zealand is a small nation in terms of 

 population and land area, its Exclusive Economic Zone 

 (EEZ) of 1.3 million nm^ (more than 15 times the land 

 mass) is the fourth largest in the world. Most of the 

 EEZ is deep; 72% of the zone has waters deeper than 

 1000 m, so it is difficult to judge the total potential 

 yield. 



Historically, New Zealand fisheries were restricted 

 to coastal waters (<200m in depth) and yielded less 

 than 50,000 tons annually (Fig. 1). Deepwater fisheries 

 (to 1500m) developed during the 1970s, and the yield 

 increased rapidly to a peak of about 500,000 tons in 

 1977. Most of the increase was due to foreign fishing. 

 In 1978, New Zealand extended its jurisdiction to 200 

 miles. The yield decreased sharply for a few years, but 

 it has since returned to about 500,000 tons. Since 

 extended jurisdiction, domestic fishing has replaced 

 almost all of the foreign fishing. However, it should be 

 noted that much of the catch recorded as domestic is 

 actually taken by foreign vessels and foreign crews 

 imder contract to New Zealand firms. In 1987, the first 

 sale value of the catch was about $350 million NZ.'^ 

 The export value of New Zealand fisheries products in- 

 creased from $50 million NZ in 1977 to $676 million 

 NZ in 1987. The 1987 figure represented about 6% of 

 New Zealand's total exports (Bevin et al. 1989). 



Fisheries management began with the Fisheries Act 

 of 1908 which established authority for input controls, 

 such as limited entry licensing, closed areas and sea- 

 sons, controls on minimum fish sizes, and requirements 

 for vessels to land at specific ports. The actual basis 

 for the number of licenses allowed in the fisheries is 

 unclear. Restrictive licensing was repealed in 1963. 



New Zealand established authority for output con- 

 trols (i.e., total allowable catches, or TACs) in 1978 

 when it extended jurisdiction. At the same time, a 

 moratorium was placed on new fishing permits for rock 

 lobsters and scallops. In 1980 the moratorium was ex- 

 tended to finfish permits. In 1983, a Deepwater Enter- 

 prise Allocation system was established. Deepwater 

 Enterprise Allocations were a forerunner of ITQs. 

 Quota for each of the species fished in deep water 

 (below about 200 m) was allocated to nine companies 

 which had already invested in deepwater harvesting 

 and shoreside processing capability. The motivation for 

 the Deepwater Enterprise Allocations was not over- 



1 'T 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 



90 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 



Figure 1 



Annual yields from New Zealand EEZ, 1890-1990. 



fishing or overcapitalization. It was intended to pre- 

 vent these ills from occurring (Clark et. al. 1988) 

 Presumably, it also encouraged investment in the deep- 

 water fisheries and hastened the replacement of for- 

 eign fishing activity by domestic fishing. The quotas 

 were initially awarded for a period of ten years, but 

 were made permanent in 1985. Although the govern- 

 ment had no authority to make quotas transferable, 

 there was considerable de facto trading and leasing of 

 shares among the nine companies. 



New Zealand implemented ITQs for most of its fish- 

 eries in October 1986. The Government gave several 

 reasons for introducing ITQs. According to Crothers 

 (1988), "Fishery managers were faced with an open 

 access inshore fishery under severe biological and 

 economic pressure . . . many of the prime species were 

 experiencing growth and probably recruitment over- 

 fishing. . .and the industry was overcapitalized, crip- 

 pled by excessive government management interven- 

 tion, and rapidly declining economic performance." A 

 government publication titled "Inshore Finfish Fish- 

 eries: Proposed Policy for Future Management" 

 (Anonymous 1984) stated that "... a broad description 

 of the problem of the inshore fishery is that the major 

 fish stocks are too low as a result of overfishing. . . 

 there has been a moratorium on new entries to the 

 inshore . . . part-time fisherman were removed admin- 

 istratively . . . this had a negligible effect on fishing 

 effort or catch . . . the harvesting sector remains over- 

 capitalized. "■* In summary, the government turned to 



^ The fishing heritage of the Maori people and the Treaty of Waitangi 

 are more than a matter of passing interest. As will be discussed 

 later in the paper, the Treaty of Waitangi has complicated implemen- 

 tation of ITQ management. 



^Economic values are expressed in New Zealand dollars which equal 

 about $0.58 U.S. 



* While the removal of part-time fishermen may have had a negli- 

 gible effect on fishing effort or catch, it did have social ramifica- 

 tions. Many of the part-time fishermen were Maoris. It could be 

 argued that their removal was one of the factors that stimulated 

 them to attempt to regain access to the fisheries through the courts 

 under the Treaty of Waitangi. 



