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Fishery Bulletin 90(1). 1992 



(Clark et al. 1988), it is worth considering what has 

 happened to date, to the extent this is possible given 

 limitations in available information. As discussed 

 earlier, government authors and government publica- 

 tions indicate that the ITQ system was put in place to 

 address three problems: (1) conservation, (2) economic 

 performance, and (3) government intervention. The 

 initial effects of the ITQ system with respect to these 

 problems are discussed below. 



Conservation 



There is little evidence of improvement in the condi- 

 tion of fisheries resources; but since stock assessment 

 information is limited, it is difficult to know. The in- 

 crease in TACs that lead to the revenues reported in 

 Table 3 resulted from a reassessment of the stocks, and 

 not an increase in abundance.'' There is evidence that 

 some stocks have declined, most notably orange 

 roughy, which has been found to be much less produc- 

 tive than previously believed (Mace et al. 1990). The 

 current TAG for the largest stock of orange roughy ex- 

 ceeds even the most optimistic estimates of long-term 

 sustainable yield by a factor of three. ITQs are not 

 responsible for the problem, but have done little to 

 resolve it. 



There are several species in addition to orange 

 roughy in need of TAC reductions. There is accum- 

 ulating evidence that TACs are too high in the long 

 term for valuable species such as hoki, squid, paua, and 

 rock lobster (Annala 1990). At the 1989 FAM (Annala 

 1989), MCY was estimated for 110 management units. 

 Twenty-one of the estimates were within 10% of the 

 TACs, 82 were less than 90% of the TAC, and only 7 

 were greater than 110% of the TAC. CAY was esti- 

 mated for nine management units. One estimate was 

 within 10% of the TAC, seven were less than 90% of 

 the TAC, and one was greater than 110% of the TAC. 

 In 36 cases, yield estimates were less than 50% of the 

 TAC. Reductions in TACs, either immediate or grad- 

 ually toward MCY or CAY estimates, were recom- 

 mended for several species. In other cases, reductions 

 were not recommended because of uncertainty in MCY 

 or CAY estimates, because accumulated biomass was 

 still being fished down (in new or developing fisheries), 

 or because recent catches indicated it was unlikely the 



"In the case of hoki, the increase in TAC from 100,000 tons in 

 1985-86 to 250,000 tons in 1986-87 was controversial. Some com- 

 ponents of industry were skeptical of the assessment which was 

 in part based on a single hydroacoustics survey. The hydroacoustics 

 survey results were later found to be gross overestimates. So far, 

 the hoki resource has sustained the increase in TAC, but stock 

 assessment results (Annala 1990) suggest that a catch of 250,000 

 tons may not be sustainable over the longer term. Government is 

 giving high priority to monitoring the stock. 



TAC would be reached. It should also be noted that 

 "actual" TACs are now almost invariably higher than 

 "official" TACs, mostly as a result of successful appeals 

 to the Quota Appeals Authority. Some of the differ- 

 ences are trivial, but a comparison between actual and 

 official TACs from Annala (1989) indicates that of the 

 122 scientifically-based TACs (i.e., excluding the 47 ad- 

 ministrative TACs), 25% of the actual TACs exceeded 

 the official TACs by more than 10%, and 6% were 

 higher by more than 20%. 



There are also many species for which the TAC 

 greatly exceeds the catch. For example, in the 1987-88 

 fishing year, the TAC was undercaught by more than 

 10% in 122 (out of 169) management units (including 

 47 "administrative" management units that have TACs 

 of only 10-30 tons), and by more than 20% in 104 man- 

 agement units (Annala et al. 1991). For the 1988-89 

 fishing year, the total catch for all management units 

 was 66% of the sum of the actual TACs. In situations 

 in which TACs are nonrestrictive, they have little con- 

 servation benefit. In these cases, the stocks are either 

 being overfished (because TACs are too high), or they 

 would not be overfished without the ITQ system. There 

 are other cases in which TACs have been overrun (17 

 of the 169 management units exceeded the TAC by 

 more than 10% in the 1987-88 fishing year; Annala 

 et al. 1991). There are a number of mechanisms by 

 which fishermen can legally exceed their quota. Most 

 of these mechanisms were established in order to deal 

 with bycatch in multispecies trawl fisheries. 



The general conclusion is that TACs are not closely 

 tied to the best available assessments of the fisheries 

 resources, nor are catches strongly controled by the 

 TACs. Some valuable stocks have probably declined in 

 abundance. To date, the track record of ITQ manage- 

 ment with respect to conservation is not good. 



Economic effects 



There is even less information on the economic effects 

 of ITQ management. ITQ management could increase 

 economic benefits through several mechanisms: (1) 

 Conservation could lead to an increase in resource 

 abundance and a decrease in harvesting costs; (2) the 

 initial buyback of quota and prorated cuts might have 

 caused some excess capital and labor to move to seg- 

 ments of the economy where they could add produc- 

 tion; (3) transfer of quota might have led to consolida- 

 tion of ownership by the most efficient operators, and 

 resulted in some excess capital being removed from the 

 fishery; and (4) elimination of competition for TACs 

 might have resulted in a more efficient harvest and an 

 increase in the value of product. 



As discussed earlier, it is unlikely that ITQ man- 

 agement has resulted in an increase in population 



