154 John B. Calhoun 



for social satiation, while the other's i'^^ represents a social facilitation, the 

 opposite of a social sanction. 



I shall leave the concept of social facilitation at this theoretical level 

 without seeking empirical confirmation. However, excellent data have been 

 presented by Aloreno (195o; Moreno and Jennings, 1960) which permit 

 an exploration of the probable validity of *Sj-'^', Eq. (92). 



B. The Choosing of a Partner 



We have already seen that >S.^"), Eq. (107), and Si^\ Eq. (109), relate 

 to those response-evoking capacities of an individual's target diameter 

 which determine the intensity with which associates will respectively im- 

 pose sanctions or facilitations. S\-'^\ Eq. (92), and S^^^ Eq. (93), like- 

 wise represent aspects of one's target diameter influencing the response of 

 others. One's own S'-'^^ determines the probability of being chosen by others 

 as an appropriate object for social response, while one's own S'^"^ similarly 

 determines the probability of being rejected. No doubt there are excellent 

 empirical data for testing the validity of S'-'^K However, I shall confine 

 myself to S'-'^''. If I can show the likelihood of aS^^^ being an approximation 

 of reality, it follows that «S^°^ can be similarly justified as a concept. 



Moreno (1953, 1960) presents a set of data for which there has been no 

 adequate formulation of their origin. In seven cottages each containing 

 exactly 26 delinquent girls, he asked each girl to choose three others in 

 their own cottage whom they would most like to sit close to at the dining 

 table. This instruction presents marked complications in determining 

 whether Eq. (105) wall account for the observed results. However, Eq. 

 (105) includes the possibility that one wdll choose oneself as a partner; 

 that is, one will choose to eat alone. Moreno by his instructions excluded 

 this possibility. Further, Moreno's instructions precluded the possibility 

 of choosing the same person two or three times, which Eq. (105) permits 

 on successive independent choices. Dr. Clifford Patlak worked out for me 

 the full set of equations required to determine how many times each in- 

 dividual would be chosen, considering Moreno's restrictions, after the 

 probability, p, of being chosen was calculated by Eq. (105) for each iih 

 individual in an N = 26. Moreno's restrictions so complicated the calcula- 

 tions that it was concluded that a simple lottery would adequately test 

 the applicability of the present theory, and at the same time avoid the 

 time-consuming job of developing a computer program to the same end. 

 This was done as follows: 



1. Sl''^^ was calculated by Eq. (92) for each of the 26 members of N, 

 from Si'^'> for the alpha-ranked individual to Sii^ for the omega- 

 ranked individual. 



